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ADMINISTERING ELECTION LAW
SAUL ZIPKIN

*

In recent years, commentators have expressed heightened concern
about the harms to democratic legitimacy caused by political actors
making decisions about the electoral process on partisan or incumbentprotecting bases. This concern has been recognized in a number of
judicial opinions, but has not taken form in election law doctrine. This
Article argues that administrative law presents a well-developed doctrinal
resource for addressing concerns about democratic legitimacy in the
electoral process. Administrative law trades off some direct electoral
control for some demonstrated expertise and shores up the democratic
element through lines of accountability to the legislature, the executive,
and the public. The resulting framework seeks an optimal balance in
effective democratic governance. Despite the institutional differences
between administrative law and election law, both confront the central
challenge of securing democratic legitimacy in contexts of governance by
state actors who are shielded from robust accountability mechanisms. In
connecting the treatment of democratic values across the administrative
law and election law settings, reflecting the operation and selection of
government, I contend that these settings demand similar models of
governmental decisionmaking. This approach calls for regulation of
elections on a standard of instrumental rationality as to the means of
reaching politically determined and constitutionally valid ends, thereby
promoting the effective operation of the democratic process. To illustrate
this approach, I sketch a framework for adapting administrative law tools
to the election law setting, with examples from current controversies in the
field.

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
I am grateful to Eric Berger, Ned Foley, Sam Issacharoff, Tricia Seith, Marc Spindelman, and
Dan Tokaji for conversations about this project and comments on drafts. I greatly benefited
from presentations at faculty workshops at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law
and the University of Nebraska College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Democratic ideals shape the legal treatment of state action in
numerous ways. Courts accord a presumption of constitutionality to
1
statutes enacted by the legislature, and a number of doctrines reflect a

1. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (describing, as a
“presumption of constitutionality,” that “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a
plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds”).
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2

preference for decisions made by the political branches. In contrast,
concerns arise when non-elected actors make decisions for the polity.
3
Hesitations about judicial review are familiar, as are doubts about the
4
legitimacy of actions taken by administrative officials. In these settings,
state actors who are not directly accountable to the public through
elections are justified as legitimate authorities only in particular settings
characterized by procedural protections and limitations as to substance.
The context of elections complicates this framework because the
usual deference to elected officials clashes with the need to ensure the
propriety of the process by which those same officials are chosen.
Deference to political oversight of the electoral process threatens
circular justification, suggesting that those making decisions about the
electoral process are democratically accountable via the very election
procedures being challenged. In egregious situations, like the severely
malapportioned state legislatures at issue in the early one person–one
vote decisions, the federal courts have intervened in the electoral
5
process in order to promote accountability. However, the courts have
not settled on what, if anything, to do in settings of less dramatic harm.
In recent years, commentators and judges have displayed heightened
concern about political actors making decisions about the electoral
process on partisan or incumbent-protecting bases, and have called for
6
greater policing of this dynamic. Such arguments have been advanced
in a variety of election law contexts, including election administration,
the redistricting process, campaign finance law, and political party
regulation, but the concerns they raise have not been well integrated
into election law doctrine or into the broader framework of
constitutional law. As a result, despite awareness of district lines drawn
to dissuade challengers or to maximize partisan gains, campaign finance

2. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (explaining the countermajoritarian difficulty).
4. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (discussing the means of legitimating agency action through
administrative law).
5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545, 586–87 (1964) (striking down a state
districting scheme with a disparity in population of up to 41-to-1 between districts); cf.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 n.39 (2008) (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court’s involvement in the oversight of legislative districting “was justified because
the political process was manifestly unable to solve the problem of unequal districts”).
6. See infra Part II (discussing these arguments).
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laws that make it difficult to effectively challenge incumbents, election
administration provisions that constrain the ability of certain voters to
vote, and ballot access rules that limit the capacity of third parties to
appear before the voters, election law doctrine has generally allowed for
these manipulations.
Though the right to vote might be thought to provide a robust
vehicle for judicial oversight of the electoral process, challenges to the
operation of the democratic process often prove difficult to formulate as
effective rights claims. As a result, some commentators have advocated
a structural approach in the election setting, but this model presents its
own difficulties due to the limited guidance provided by the
constitutional text regarding the democratic process as well as
hesitations about a judicial role in choosing among political theories.
Consequently, despite the explosion of election law litigation since the
eye-opening events surrounding the 2000 election, and the
corresponding growth in popular and scholarly interest in these issues,
the federal courts have not developed a comprehensive account of the
appropriate judicial treatment of claims addressing the operation of the
democratic process. In this Article, I leverage the doctrinal and
conceptual frameworks of administrative law to advance such an
account.
This Article contends that the tools and thinking that courts have
developed in response to concerns about democratic legitimacy in the
administrative law setting can provide guidance for the effort to
confront analogous concerns in election law. In a context in which
demands for accountability can collide with the governance needs of the
modern regulatory state, administrative law doctrine draws an elaborate
framework presenting multiple tracks of political oversight that are
balanced against the deployment of expertise-based judgment by agency
7
officials. Administrative law promotes lines of responsiveness to the
8
legislature, the executive, and the people, and trades off some electoral
control for the demonstrated exercise of instrumental knowledge, in
part through a framework of means-ends reasoning. This framing of
7. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) (arguing that “[n]o single mode of
democratic legitimation can serve to mediate between the conflicted, protean, often inchoate
will of the people and the modern regulatory enterprise”).
8. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2363 (2001)
(arguing that “most of administrative law is best understood as a set of rules for allocating
control over agency action to diverse individuals and institutions”).
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administrative law doctrine reveals a nuanced judicial response to the
challenge of balancing popular accountability and effective governance.
Although the election law concerns I discuss here implicate the
content of substantive law rather than the identity of the lawmaker, as
administrative law does, the challenge posed by state actors shielded
from effective accountability mechanisms counsels a similar framework
of legitimation. Much as administrative law doctrine seeks to counteract
any deficit of democracy by demanding that agency officials act on the
basis of reasoned judgment, I argue that political actors enacting
election provisions should likewise be held to a standard of instrumental
rationality as a means of promoting the effective operation of the
9
electoral process. In doctrinal terms, I propose that courts considering
election claims evaluate whether the challenged provision reflects a
reasonable judgment as a means of reaching politically determined and
constitutionally valid ends.
In developing this claim, I (1) specify the democratic concerns at
issue in the election law setting; (2) articulate the mechanisms by which
courts have approached the problem of democratic legitimacy in the
administrative law setting, a framework embedded within a broader
account of constitutional law; (3) explain how the administrative law
framework is a desirable model in that the democratic concerns to which
it responds and the forms of judgment it demands are usefully analogous
to those at issue in the election setting; and (4) sketch specific ways in
which the administrative law tools might be adapted and applied to the
election law context, using as examples challenges to voter identification
provisions and districting claims. The four Parts of this Article address
these points in turn.
Through this discussion, I aim to sharpen the connection between
the role of democratic values in the operation of government and in the
selection of government. Though both administrative law and election
law are broadly characterized by concerns about democratic legitimacy
and accountability, the doctrines and scholarly dialogues have thus far
10
proceeded largely in parallel, with little overlap.
In drawing this
9. By “democracy,” I mean to invoke a colloquial and basic account of democratic
practice, characterized by state action based on popular will as reflected through fair elections
that broadly allow for both ex ante selection of governing officials and retrospective power to
remove those officials. I say more about my account of democracy in Part IV.
10. For some exceptions, see Heather K. Gerken, Essay, A Third Way for the Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 746–48 (2006)
(examining administrative law frameworks in the election law setting); Note, A Federal
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account of democracy in operation across governmental settings, I seek
to build on those who have pointed to connections between the election
11
and governing settings and to explore the integration of election law
with a larger account of public law, encompassing the various bodies of
12
law that shape the structural operation of the state. While scholars
have demonstrated “why voting is different” and should not casually be
13
treated like other rights, this Article considers one way in which
election law presents a component of an integrated body of public law
shaping an appealing model of democratic governance.
The recent rise in arguments that decisions regarding the democratic
process should not be made on a partisan or incumbent-protecting basis,
and the recurring echo in judicial opinions of this concern, reflect an
anxiety about the democratic legitimacy of the political struggle over the
structures that legitimize political decisions.
Given longstanding
concerns about authority exercised by unelected agency officials, are
independent districting commissions a good idea? Should we view the
districting process as akin to, say, monetary policy, a matter historically
shielded from political whim but also not subjected to some form of
14
heightened judicial review? To what extent is the electoral process a
Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1843 (2008)
(advocating creation of a federal agency for review of partisan redistricting claims but
“providing a safe harbor for states that use independent agencies to redraw district lines”).
11. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 131–33 (1980) (calling for a more robust nondelegation doctrine and arguing that
“[t]here can be little point in worrying about the distribution of the franchise and other
personal political rights unless the important policy choices are being made by elected
officials”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1707–08 (1993) (describing right to vote to include interests in participation,
aggregation, and governance).
12. See generally Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179 (2011) (offering
an account of integration of election law and federal courts doctrine in the justiciability
context).
13. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
1201, 1202–04 (1996).
14. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 42 (noting that in domestic administrative
law schemes, accountability mechanisms may not apply uniformly and that “[e]xceptions, or
at least lower standards, commonly apply, for instance, to matters of national security and to
the decisions of central banks”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622 n.202 (1984)
(noting that “it has long been argued that the conduct of monetary policy, although not
carried out using formal procedures, must be free of the suspicion of political influence”); cf.
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration
to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 983–84 (2005) (arguing that for
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matter of constitutional concern and of heightened judicial skepticism?
Or do the demands of democracy require that decisions about the
democratic process be left to the political process? I suggest here one
orientation toward these issues, following on the elaborate doctrinal
model developed in another area of democratic concern.
II. ELECTION LAW AND THE CONCERN ABOUT SELF-DEALING
In recent years, commentators and judges have expressed
heightened concern about electoral provisions that appear to be
motivated by “political” interests, designed to promote particular
15
outcomes on partisan or incumbent-protecting grounds (or both).
Across a number of election law settings, such provisions have been
challenged on the basis that they compromise the democratic legitimacy
of the electoral process by distorting that process to achieve a specific
result. While these criticisms have mostly not been endorsed in
doctrine, they have been taken seriously by individual justices and
judges, and they now reflect a significant focus in election law
scholarship.
This Part sets out this concern and its treatment by the federal
courts. After describing this dynamic in a number of electoral contexts,
I explain why an individual rights framework has not succeeded in
dealing with this concern, and discuss the need for a structural account
of the democratic process that is consistent with the broader framework
of constitutional law.
A. Democratic Legitimacy Concerns in Election Law
Across a variety of election law settings, we see a recurring concern
about manipulation of the electoral process. This is not a particularly
unexpected result of a process that leaves the players—or some
16
players—to act as the umpires.
In the winner-take-all setting of
American elections, the incentives all point in one direction, especially
to the extent that election law doctrine does not give courts the tools

the election administrator “[t]he desired model is that of Alan Greenspan, not Katherine
Harris”).
15. For an influential version of this point, see ELY, supra note 11, at 102–03, calling for
judicial intervention “only when the ‘market,’ in our case the political market, is
systematically malfunctioning,” such as when “the ins are choking off the channels of political
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”
16. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 64 (2003).
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with which to effectively police such practices. In this Part, I describe
this dynamic in four prominent settings.
1. The Districting Process
The districting process is the election context in which concerns
about self-dealing are most pronounced.
The basic point is
straightforward: whoever controls the line-drawing process has the
power to draw districts they and their cohorts are likely to win, a power
line-drawers have often been willing to exercise since at least the days of
17
Elbridge Gerry. Despite its vintage and claims to tradition, numerous
commentators have criticized and sought to limit this practice, arguing
that a system in which few incumbents are confronted by meaningful
18
challenge cannot be said to ensure democratic accountability, a
fundamental commitment of the democratic process.
Samuel Issacharoff advances such an argument, contending that
“[a]llowing partisan actors to control redistricting so as to diminish
competition runs solidly counter to the core concern of democratic
19
accountability,” and calling for “blue-ribbon commissions, panels of
20
retired judges, and Iowa’s computer-based models” as possible
alternatives to the status quo. Other observers have likewise advocated
21
models for independent districting commissions, as well as various
22
other doctrinal responses. Concerns about self-interested districting
17. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF
INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 55–56 (2008) (describing the birth of the “gerrymander”); see also Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (noting that “[o]ne scholar traces [gerrymanders] back to
the Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century”).
18. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV.
253, 256–57 & tbl.1 (2006) (presenting data demonstrating that “congressional elections in the
wake of the post-2000 redistricting were the least competitive in American history”); Jane S.
Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 641, 646 (2009) (noting that “[e]ven in the 2008 election, only fifty of 435 House seats
were decided by fewer than ten percentage points, and that number is itself higher than the
average in most recent elections”).
19. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
623 (2002).
20. Id. at 644.
21. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral
Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425 (2006) (surveying possibilities for the use of
independent electoral commissions).
22. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783, 838–
53 (2005) (elaborating on the constitutional prohibition on “excessive partisanship” in the
districting process and suggesting decision rules to implement that prohibition); Richard
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are shared by the public to some extent, as suggested by a recent study
which concluded that “among the minority of voters with an opinion on
the question, voters generally favor a redistricting process that requires
23
bargaining and is run by disinterested actors.”
The Supreme Court has recognized concerns about partisanship in
the districting process even as it has declined to do much about it. In
1986, the Court allowed for a partisan gerrymandering claim, with the
perhaps-impossible-to-demonstrate standard that the challenged scheme
“will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
24
political process as a whole.” Eighteen years later, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
the Court took back whatever it had given, with a plurality finding a lack
of judicially manageable standards for identifying a constitutional
25
violation. Justice Scalia’s opinion indicated that excess partisanship
was nonetheless constitutionally troublesome, a conclusion apparently
26
shared by all the Justices. In short, commentators and courts have
expressed concerns of varying degrees about districting done on a
partisan basis, while disagreeing about what, if anything, courts can or
27
should do about it.
2. Election Administration
While the pathologies of the districting process are the subject of
longstanding debate, analogous concerns in the area of election
administration have blossomed in the last decade, owing largely to the
Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 397, 413–18 (2005) (emphasizing the “excessive partisanship” account of the
problem); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 604–
05 (2007) (arguing that “the central harm of political gerrymandering is what I term
institutional distortion—political elites’ manipulation of governance institutions or electoral
structures to distort electoral outcomes in order to produce a particular result”); Michael S.
Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2006) (calling for a direct democracy solution to concerns
about redistricting).
23. Joshua Fougere et al., Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION
L.J. 325, 341 (2010).
24. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
25. 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004).
26. Id. at 293 (noting Justice Stevens’ argument that “an excessive injection of politics [in
districting] is unlawful” and responding “[s]o it is and so does our opinion assume”).
27. Courts have used the one person–one vote doctrine in some instances to enforce
concerns about partisan line-drawing. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 875–80 (3d ed. 2007)
(discussing Cox v. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.), summarily aff’d, 542 U.S. 947
(2004), and other cases).
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debacle revealed in the 2000 presidential election. Commentators have
detailed the many problems of election administration in America
28
today, and they are fairly dispiriting.
These distortions have been
29
ascribed to practices of local and partisan control of elections. The
partisanship element in particular has been the focus of commentators
30
in recent years, and it raises the same entrenchment and democratic
31
legitimacy concerns as the districting setting. Where the Secretary of
State in charge of administering the election is the campaign chair for
one of the candidates, one might reasonably question the democratic
32
propriety of her decisions.
A desire for nonpartisan election
33
administration is apparently shared by the public as well. Reflecting a
somewhat analogous challenge, commentators have raised concerns
about the Department of Justice’s preclearance practices under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act as well, suggesting that some decisions may
34
have been made for partisan advantage.
But the partisan actions of election officials affiliated with one of the
competitors may be the low-hanging fruit in this setting. Because
election law is made by political actors, such as the state legislature, all
practices are subject to partisan or incumbent-protecting motivations.
Some commentators have addressed these concerns, advancing
proposals for apolitical institutions and regulatory practices that would

28. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 1–3, 11–14 (2009) (discussing problems of the
electoral system).
29. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28
YALE. L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127 (2009) [hereinafter Tokaji, The Future] (noting that
“decentralization and partisanship remain the two dominant characteristics of American
election administration”).
30. See Hasen, supra note 14, at 973–91 (calling for non-partisan state election
administration).
31. See Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 787,
789–90 (2009) (reviewing GERKEN, supra note 28) (“Although entrenchment is understood as
central to certain concerns, such as partisan gerrymandering, it has not been a prominent
element of scholarship or jurisprudence about many other election-law concerns, such as
campaign finance and election administration.” (footnote omitted)).
32. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421, 431–35 (2010) [hereinafter Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra
Lowenstein] (discussing problems of conflicts of interest in the context of election
administration).
33. See Tokaji, The Future, supra note 29, at 132 (discussing survey results on this point).
34. See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,
49 HOW. L.J. 785, 807–19 (2006) (discussing preclearance of the Texas redistricting plan in
2003 and Georgia voter identification law in 2005).
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allow for the shoring up of democratic legitimacy in the electoral
35
process, encompassing both election administration and districting.
Here again, we see some concern about election rules promulgated on
improper bases, even when not rising to the level of a remediable voting
36
rights violation.
While judicial doctrine has not embraced partisan self-dealing as a
basis for striking down election administration practices, expressions of
concern about this dynamic do appear in the case law. In Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board, a challenge to an Indiana voter
identification law, a plurality of the Supreme Court did not view the fact
that the provision had been enacted on a party-line vote as a basis for
37
finding the law unconstitutional. While the plurality noted that “[i]t is
fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant
role in the decision to enact” the law, it concluded that “if a
nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those
justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests
may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual
38
legislators.” On the Court’s account of the right to vote, the fact that
the state could invoke the interest in ballot security was sufficient; even
so, the fact that it is difficult to imagine the Court taking seriously a
claim based on a party-line vote or partisan advantage in challenges to
non-electoral laws highlights the relevance of the issue in this setting.
This recognition was brought out somewhat more strongly in Judge

35. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1075, 1085–88 (2010) (reviewing GERKEN, supra note 28) (discussing this
“New Institutionalism” approach); see also GERKEN, supra note 28, at 5 (calling for
development of “Democracy Index” as “a data-driven, information-forcing device designed
to generate pressure for reform while helping us make more sensible choices about which
reforms to pursue”).
36. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 650 (2008)
(“When one political party uses its position of control over the legislative and executive
branches of government to enact voting requirements that the other major party regards as a
ploy to deter its constituents from exercising the franchise, the need for representationreinforcing review would seem to have reached its apogee.”). Professors Issacharoff and
Pildes have emphasized that individual rights violations in the election setting may likewise
rest on partisan motivations. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 660–66 (1998) (discussing
Texas Democrats’ motivations to bar African Americans from voting in the party primaries at
issue in the White Primary Cases).
37. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203–04 (2008).
38. Id.
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Evans’s dissent to the Seventh Circuit’s Crawford opinion, which begins,
“Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a
not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by
39
certain folks believed to skew Democratic.” Judge Evans called for
40
something like “strict scrutiny light” in response, but, beyond asserting
that the sliding scale scrutiny level framework applicable to the claim
41
allows for this move, he did not develop the doctrinal analysis. These
treatments of the voter identification law call for a more developed
42
constitutional account of this concern.
3. Campaign Finance
The concern about self-dealing has arisen in the campaign finance
context as well, often on an incumbent-protecting basis. Justice Scalia
has argued that campaign finance limitations serve as a means of
43
protecting incumbents against challengers, and commentators have
44
made this point as well. On this account, incumbent politicians know
they have numerous inherent advantages, and enact campaign finance
regulations to deny potential challengers the ability to overcome those
advantages by raising and spending more money. Inasmuch as the
advantages of incumbency may include the ability to raise vast funds,

39. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 954, 956.
41. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 325 (2007) (making this point as part
of a discussion of the failure of lower courts “to develop and apply explicitly intent-informed
standards of review”).
42. See Recent Case, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir.
2007), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1980, 1984–85 (2007) (analogizing the Crawford case to the
campaign finance concerns about entrenchment).
43. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 249–50 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing
that “any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers
and incumbents tends to favor incumbents” and that “the present legislation targets for
prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to
incumbents”).
44. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 29, 134 & n.455 (2004) (listing sources viewing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
as “little more than an incumbent-protection scheme”); Peter J. Wallison & Joel M. Gora,
Burying the Incumbent Protection Racket, THE AMERICAN (June 16, 2010),
http://www.american.com/archive/2010/june-2010/burying-the-incumbent-protection-racket;
cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 62 (noting that bipartisan institutions like the Federal Election
Commission “have incentives to behave as a duopoly, exempting themselves from the law and
undermining political competition”).
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the empirical underpinnings of this argument might be questioned.
Nonetheless, this argument reflects the same concerns as those
advanced in the districting and election administration settings, that
political actors manipulate the regulations of the electoral process to
favor certain outcomes.
Justice Breyer, who has generally been sympathetic to campaign
finance measures, has raised this point as well. Concurring in a decision
upholding strict contribution limits in 2000, he noted that the Court
“should not defer in respect to whether [the legislature’s] solution, by
imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the
reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and
45
thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge.” This
concern was dispositive a few years later, in a decision striking down
Vermont’s contribution limits as too low, because “contribution limits
that are too low can also harm the electoral process by preventing
challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent
46
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.”
This
explicit protection of the competitive process reveals an underlying
account of election law as necessary to ensure the democratic
accountability that elections are designed to guarantee.
4. Political Parties
The law governing political parties, and especially the question of
ballot access restrictions that affect the ability of third parties to get on
the ballot, reflects these concerns as well. For example, in dissenting
47
from a decision upholding a state law banning “fusion” candidacies,
Justice Stevens indicated that “[t]he fact that the law was both intended
to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a matter that
48
should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutionality.”
Similarly, in a case brought by a third party that wanted to allow
49
participation in its primary by members of other parties, Justice

45. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
46. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–49 (2006).
47. “‘Fusion,’ also called ‘cross-filing’ or ‘multiple-party nomination,’ is ‘the electoral
support of a single set of candidates by two or more parties.’” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353 n.1 (1997) (quoting Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the
Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288 (1980)).
48. Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. “In a semi-closed primary, independent and non-affiliated voters are permitted to
participate in the primaries, but not members of the opposing party.” ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
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O’Connor observed that
[a]lthough the State has a legitimate—and indeed critical—role
to play in regulating elections, it must be recognized that it is not
a wholly independent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is
itself controlled by the political party or parties in power, which
presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of the electoral
50
game to their own benefit.
Much like the Crawford plurality, Justice O’Connor concluded that
skeptical review was nonetheless only required when the challenged
restrictions are severe “and particularly where they have discriminatory
51
effects,” highlighting the disconnect between the concern and the
doctrine. Commentators have likewise criticized the Court’s protection
of the two-party system and approval of ballot access restrictions for
52
third parties.
Yet another setting in which this concern has come up is access for
candidates within a party to the primary ballot. Nathaniel Persily has
explored the obstacles impeding John McCain’s ability to get on the
ballot for the 2000 Republican primary in New York, and described the
“common sense approach” of the court considering the challenge to
those rules, asking: “If Senator John McCain—a candidate who agreed
to accept federal matching funds and spending limits, the main
challenger to Governor Bush, a leader in the polls in several states, and
the victor in the New Hampshire primary—could not get on the ballot,
53
then how could the laws possibly be constitutional?”
Professor
Persily’s paraphrase of the Court’s question—“Why have a primary at
all if the practical barriers to candidate entry can only be surmounted by
54
the nominee already backed by the party establishment?” —reflects the
larger issue in these cases.
supra note 27, at 283.
50. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 332–33 (1997); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at
674–90.
53. Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary
Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2205 (2001).
54. Id.
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5. Other Election Law Settings
These concerns have taken two related forms as well. One theme
has been the appearance of judicial discomfort, not with specifically
partisan or incumbent-protecting actions, but with politics more
55
56
generally. Bush v. Gore provides a striking example of this dynamic;
57
in a setting whose mechanisms are provided for by law, the Court
intervened to resolve the situation without letting the specified
58
procedures for decision by Congress occur. While some commentators
59
praised the Court for avoiding the chaos that this process might yield,
60
others criticized the plurality on this ground. What is interesting here
is not whether the Court was right or wrong; rather, the instinctual
concern—not explained in the Court’s per curiam opinion—that leaving
the matter to the political process would somehow be harmful is
consistent both with the recurring sense that politically based
decisionmaking is troubling in this setting and with the inability or
refusal to formally incorporate these concerns into the doctrine.
This dynamic also connects to a growing concern that judicial
treatment of election law claims can likewise be infected by partisanship
and harm democratic legitimacy. Empirical studies suggest that courts
may be influenced by ideological considerations when deciding Voting
61
Rights Act claims, presenting a challenge to the hope of judicial
salvation from the pathologies of political decisions about elections.
Commentators have raised the concern that judicial intervention in
election disputes threatens harm to democratic legitimacy based on the

55. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 716 (2001)
(developing this argument).
56. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
57. See id. at 153–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Twelfth Amendment
commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count electoral votes”).
58. See id. at 111 (per curiam) (rejecting Justice Breyer’s argument and stating that
“[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has
been forced to confront”).
59. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 4 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore “averted what might
well have been (though the Pollyannas deny this) a political and constitutional crisis”).
60. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650–53 (2001)
(contending that the judiciary was not the proper entity to make this decision).
61. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2008) (concluding that “judicial ideology significantly influences judicial
decisionmaking in Voting Rights Act cases”).
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62

threat of perception of partisan bias, and have, for example, called for
63
the formation of special election courts to resolve disputed elections.
As this discussion suggests, every element and each stage of the process
of determining the rules that govern elections have been subject to
anxieties about the democratic legitimacy of the electoral process.
The common thread across these accounts is the sense that the
operation of the democratic process has been unfairly distorted. To the
extent the electoral process necessarily rests on a foundation of
democratic values, these arguments assert that election provisions made
on self-dealing bases undermine those values. Supreme Court decisions
in an array of election law settings corroborate this concern, even if not
framed on this account; this Article seeks to situate these concerns as an
account consistent with public law more broadly.
B. Rights and Structural Claims in the Election Context
Inasmuch as these election issues implicate the fundamental right to
vote, a right the Supreme Court has indicated is “preservative of all
64
rights,” the instinct might be to respond to these concerns through the
medium of rights claims, much as concerns about the operation of
criminal law have largely been developed through litigation invoking the
65
procedural protections found in the Bill of Rights. Yet this approach
has not effectively addressed the problem, as election claims often do
not work well when framed as individual rights claims, for a variety of
practical and conceptual reasons. We should then consider how a
framework of constitutional law could address these concerns about
democratic legitimacy on a structural approach.
The doctrine implementing the right to vote relies on a sliding-scale
model of scrutiny, under which non-severe burdens incur a minimal

62. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 36, at 645–50 (discussing this concern as presented in
voter participation cases).
63. See Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory,
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 376–79 (2007) (arguing for “specialized
election courts to handle election contests”).
64. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
65. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3–7 (1996) (detailing ways constitutional law protects only
criminal procedure and not substantive criminal law). The individual rights model has been
criticized in criminal law settings as well. See, e.g., Eva Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision
of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (arguing that “the federal habeas system is
broken largely because of its resolute focus on individual petitioners” and calling for
structural approach).
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level of scrutiny and are likely to be upheld, whereas demonstrations of
66
heightened burdens trigger heightened review.
This framework,
recently confirmed in Crawford, demands that plaintiffs provide
67
evidence of a serious burden before the state is put to its evidence.
Where plaintiffs are unable to do so, as in Crawford, the state’s simple
invocation of an interest in election security is usually sufficient to deny
68
the constitutional claim.
A number of practical hurdles impede the treatment of election
administration claims on an individual rights model. These hurdles,
exacerbated by the disfavor with which the Court has recently treated
69
facial claims in this setting, include the lack of reliable data resulting
from the pre-election nature of many of these claims and the limited
ability of the individuals who would be harmed by these provisions to
70
bring suit ex ante, as well as any distortions stemming from the focus
71
While
on the specific circumstances of particular individuals.
districting claims present fewer practical hurdles, they pose conceptual
difficulties that are similarly problematic because these aggregate claims
72
are largely inexplicable on an individual rights account.
In light of these and similar points, a number of scholars have argued
that election claims are often not amenable to being framed as a
question of rights and have called for a structural account, in which
73
courts would protect the electoral process as well as individual rights.
66. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). See generally Elmendorf, supra
note 41 (providing comprehensive analysis of the Burdick model prior to the Crawford
decision).
67. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008).
68. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (indicating that “[w]hen a state election law provision
imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify’ the restrictions” (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983))).
69. See Zipkin, supra note 12, at 216–23.
70. See id. at 219–20.
71. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(denying standing to individual plaintiffs on basis of evidence about the availability of rides
from their children or of taking a bus to the registrar’s office).
72. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1666 (2001) (explaining that, because they implicate an aggregate right, “[v]ote
dilution claims implicate a special kind of injury, one that does not fit easily with a
conventional view of individual rights”).
73. See Elmendorf, supra note 36, at 653 (arguing that “[w]hatever may be the best
understanding of the right to vote as a matter of first principles, a structural approach is the
most plausible way to avoid quagmire and resulting injury to the courts’ reputation for
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This call for a structural rather than individual rights framing of election
claims has been the subject of some debate in election law scholarship
74
but has not been developed in the doctrine.
It is worth distinguishing two elements of the structural account of
election law that are easily conflated. The first is the argument that an
individual rights approach is inappropriate or insufficient in the election
law setting, and that courts should assess these claims with reference to
a structural model instead. This argument is distinct from, and prior to,
a second claim that specifies the particular structural account that courts
should employ, for example, the claim associated with Professors
Issacharoff and Pildes that courts should seek to ensure protection of a
75
competitive electoral process.
The criticism that courts should not
select any particular structural account to serve as a constitutional
76
standard brings these two points together. The basic question here is
reasoned, impartial decision-making”); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The
Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004)
(arguing that “[t]he Court has long tried to use a conventional individual-rights framework—
the bread-and-butter of legal analysis—to adjudicate what are often claims about the
structure of the political process” but that “[a]n individual-rights framework . . . does not
provide adequate analytic tools for resolving such challenges”); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 36, at 717 (arguing that “the crucial issues are not so much ones of individual rights of
participation as ones of the preservation of the robustly competitive partisan environment”);
Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123
HARV. L. REV. 80, 81 (2009) (contending that “Caperton continues the Court’s problematic
insistence on addressing structural problems through the lens of protecting individual
rights”); Pildes, supra note 44, at 40–41 (arguing that “understandings of individual rights,
associational rights, and conceptions of equality must be modified to develop an appropriate
constitutional framework for the increasingly important task of judicial oversight of
democratic politics”).
74. See Charles, supra note 22, at 622–25 (discussing disagreements between individual
rights and structural accounts).
75. Issacharoff, supra note 19, at 600 (arguing that “the risk in gerrymandering is not so
much that of discrimination or lack of a formal ability to participate individually, but that of
constriction of the competitive processes by which voters can express choice”); Richard H.
Pildes, Commentary, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606–07
(1999); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269
(1942) (defining “the democratic method” as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote”).
76. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 152–53 (2003) (emphasizing,
in response to Issacharoff’s structural argument, concern “about the belief that the Court not
only can and should make deeply contested normative judgments about the appropriate
functioning of the political process but also come down on one side of an empirical debate
without really taking a serious look at the evidence”); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme
Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME
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whether disagreement about the content of structural protection of the
democratic process should be treated differently than disagreements
77
about the content of rights within the democratic process or the
content of other structural models, such as federalism or separation of
powers, which also demand that the courts identify contested theoretical
commitments to enforce as constitutional law. Following the belief that
courts can enforce structural election models as well as they do
individual voting rights, I focus here on how the electoral process might
be protected as a structural matter.
Ensuring electoral competition is not the only structural ideal that
courts could vindicate in the democratic process. Alternatives might
78
79
include ideals of proper representation, avoiding entrenchment,
80
ensuring non-domination, or opportunity for deliberation. These
models may well overlap and any would require a fair bit of elaboration.
I argue for protection of democratic legitimacy in a sense specified
81
below, and for now address the challenge that confronts all of these
82
accounts: Where in the Constitution does any of this come from?
In response to this point, Professor Issacharoff acknowledges “that
the search for a textual justification was unlikely to be fruitful” but

COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283, 297–302 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002)
(arguing against structural theories and indicating that “[t]he Supreme Court should not
select a political theory and impose it on the nation any more than it should impose an
economic theory”); cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901–02 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“The matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases are
questions of political philosophy, not questions of law. As such, they are not readily
subjected to any judicially manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select
between competing theories.” (footnote omitted)).
77. See Charles, supra note 22, at 653 (making a similar point).
78. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1051, 1055, 1076–95 (2010) (proposing an “effective accountability canon” as a canon of
construction rather than an enforceable constitutional requirement, which would promote the
constitutional principle that “electoral systems should render elected bodies responsive to the
interests and concerns of the normative electorate”).
79. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 497–501 (1997) (arguing for anti-entrenchment approach).
80. See SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 51–52; Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model
and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1416–19 (2008).
81. See infra Part III.B.
82. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 652
(2002) (“Most would criticize Issacharoff’s argument, as well as the political markets
approach more generally, on the grounds that it is completely disconnected from the text of
the Constitution.”).
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argues that “[t]here is no narrow textual justification for almost any of
83
the body of law governing the political process.” He elaborates:
It is difficult to see the gain from making believe that the need to
fill in the gaps in an aging Constitution is anything other than a
response to our experience with democratic governance. There
is certainly no gain in pretending that the answers to the
questions of how to make democracy work are compelled by
vague terms such as “due process,” “equal protection,” or
“republican form of government.” The same theoretical work
would have to be done to make concrete the democratic values
84
to be read into these open-textured clauses.
My claim here is that this theoretical work should be incorporated
into a larger account of American constitutional law. The remainder of
this Article will engage that task in advancing administrative law as a
model for the way ideals of democratic legitimacy might be translated
into a doctrinal response to concerns about self-dealing in the crafting of
election provisions as a means of protecting the electoral process itself.
III. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
As numerous observers have explained, a central project of
administrative law—perhaps the central project—is the effort to cabin
85
the discretion of administrative officials. In this Part, I examine how
this commitment takes form in a model of promoting the democratic
accountability of agencies through multiple overlapping ties to
democratic actors and trading off some democratic accountability for
some instrumental expertise. I first describe the general framework of
legal justification in public law as premised on deference to elected
actors unless the challenged action is one not permitted to the political
process because it implicates a right. Where an actor not subject to
democratic accountability mechanisms takes action, the usual
presumptions about democratic legitimacy may not apply, and
alternative forms of justification are required. As a body of law
addressing the powers given entities not bearing the basic presumption

83. Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687 (2002).
84. Id. at 688.
85. For the canonical treatment of this issue, see Stewart, supra note 4.
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of democratic legitimacy, administrative law encompasses a variety of
doctrines designed to compensate for the lack of direct democratic
accountability in shaping a framework of instrumental justification.
I sketch a broad account of legal legitimation in public law in Part
III.A, and explain that the democratic accountability of the legislature
generally justifies state action but that when the action is presumptively
improper—whether it infringes on rights or was taken by the “wrong”
actor—the government is subject to heightened requirements of
justification. In Part III.B, I turn to administrative law and canvass an
array of doctrines to demonstrate that the thrust of the law in this area is
to funnel political decisions to democratically accountable actors and to
ensure that instrumental decisions are made on the basis of
demonstrable evidence that furthers the ends specified by those actors.
I argue that the use of instrumental rationality serves alongside
democratic accountability as a justificatory resource in this setting.
A. Legal Legitimation in Public Law
The problem of state action is not a new one. Thinkers have long
grappled with the question of how limitations on individual liberty can
86
be justified, and have largely embraced consent as a basis of legitimacy,
nowadays largely instantiated through democratic procedures. Here, I
consider the ways in which state action is validated in constitutional law,
a setting in which the terms of legal legitimacy turn partly on underlying
87
ideals of moral legitimacy, with those ideals often taking the form of
88
commitments to democratic values. My aim is not to confront deeper
questions about the ultimate legitimacy of the state, but to identify ways
86. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR
MODERN STATE 144–60 (2005) (discussing and criticizing this account of legitimacy and
observing that “[s]ocial contract theories are the dominant account of political legitimacy in
modern Western thought”); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1672 (“The doctrine against delegation
appears ultimately to be bottomed on contractarian political theory running back to Hobbes
and Locke, under which consent is the only legitimate basis for the exercise of the coercive
power of government.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis
of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow
immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority.”).
87. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1794–1802 (2005) (discussing ideas of legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy).
88. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 61–65 (1993) (arguing that, in constitutional
law, democracy “began to be considered a foundational concept around 1940” as a means of
justifying both restraints on and exercises of judicial power).
THE
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in which beliefs about the values that conduce to that legitimacy
(focusing on democratic values) shape judicial practice in various
constitutional settings.
The democratic pedigree of the legislature plays a prominent
legitimating role in public law. The broad deference given the
legislature upon judicial review of statutes not implicating constitutional
rights reflects the strong presumption of legitimacy accorded the
89
democratic process. Debates over statutory interpretation turn largely
90
on the best way of properly deferring to the democratic process. The
denial of procedural due process rights in the legislation context
91
provides a further example of such deference, as does the provision in
standing doctrine that generalized grievances are to be left to the
92
political branches. In these settings, the democratic process is treated
as the source of presumptive legitimacy of state action and the basis for
denying judicial review, unless the litigant provides a basis for rebutting
that presumption.
How is the presumption of legitimacy rebutted? Constitutional
challenges take two broad forms: either the particular action is
substantively improper, or a particular state actor cannot take that
action. The distinction is between (1) you can’t do that and (2) you can’t
do that, with the first reflecting the domain of constitutional rights,
while the second addresses issues of structural constitutional law such as

89. See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2010)
(“The Court recognizes that ours is a democratic government and that elected officials
answerable to ‘the people’ should make controversial policy decisions, rather than unelected
judges.”).
90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is
to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.” (footnote
omitted)).
91. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
(“General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of
individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their
rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”).
92. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (holding that “a
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government . . . does not state an
Article III case or controversy”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)
(concluding that “the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress,
and ultimately to the political process”).
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federalism and separation of powers as well as doctrines of
administrative law.
1. You Can’t Do That: Rights Violations
Rights can be seen to structure the relationship of the individual and
the state, and the contested scope of constitutional rights reflects the
contested boundaries of state power in various settings. When a right
93
protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendment is infringed, courts
engage in heightened scrutiny of the state action, taking either a strict
94
form, which tends to result in invalidation, or an intermediate form,
95
which resembles a model of balancing. Both forms of scrutiny are
comprised of three elements: an assessment of the validity of the
legislative end; an evaluation of the fit of the means of reaching that
end; and the second-order specification of a level of deference under
96
which the assessment of means and ends will be conducted.
The
challenged action is thus weighed in two dimensions—as a means of
accomplishing a valid end and as a burden on a protected right—and the
usual deference to the democratic process either does not apply at all or
applies less strongly. In short, once the right is seen to be of a kind that
incurs some heightened level of protection, the government is called
upon to justify the infringement as an effective means of achieving some
97
valid end.

93. Other constitutional rights incur different forms of scrutiny. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (shaping a somewhat categorical model for
the Second Amendment); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–11 (2009) (discussing and criticizing
Heller’s categoricalism approach); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental
Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 229–32 (2006) (noting different standards of review for
various Bill of Rights guarantees).
94. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267
(2007) (discussing development and application of strict scrutiny inquiry).
95. See Blocher, supra note 93, at 392.
96. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (describing the
intermediate scrutiny model, “under which a ‘content-neutral regulation will be sustained
under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the
suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests’” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)));
Fallon, supra note 94, at 1273 (“In modern constitutional law, the term ‘strict scrutiny’ refers
to a test under which statutes will be pronounced unconstitutional unless they are ‘necessary’
or ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”).
97. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441 (6th ed. 2009) (“The
modern Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends
methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is
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The departure from the usual democratic deference in the rights
setting can be seen as either external or internal to a democratic
account. On one hand, we might believe that some individual interests
are simply not subject to majority rule because of commitments to
fundamental liberties or basic human equality or the demands of
98
justice. Criminal procedure, due process, or equal protection rights can
be seen to be of this sort, reflecting an ideal that certain basic guarantees
must be protected against the government, no matter how proper the
99
process by which the decision was made. On this account, certain
individual rights are not subject to the political process due to overriding
value commitments, and the state’s democratic legitimacy, however
impeccable, cannot suffice to justify their infringement.
A second approach views some constitutional rights to be necessary
for the democratic process itself. Free speech rights have been defended
on this basis, as crucial for the public discussion that allows democracy
100
to operate properly.
Equal protection or other rights may present
101
similar baselines for democratic action, and others have argued that
102
Here,
the Bill of Rights more generally reflects this model as well.

sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 20–24 (1972) (developing account of equal protection review focused on the state’s
choice of means to legislatively determined end).
98. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi, 184–205 (1977)
(developing an account of rights as “political trumps held by individuals”); Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 725, 727–29 (1998) (describing and criticizing this view and noting that “[t]he
view of rights as immunities for fundamental attributes of the person is also the prevailing
view among rights philosophers”).
99. See Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
309, 311 (2000) (noting that in “the immunities view, rights emanate from some conception of
the self; rights demarcate spheres of belief and conduct insulated from majoritarian
preferences to enable fundamental attributes of that self to develop”).
100. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 22–27 (1948).
101. See Horwitz, supra note 88, at 64 (arguing that “the Warren Court majority
believed that Brown [v. Board of Education] was a precondition for, and fulfillment of,
democratic ideals” and that “[f]or the Warren Court majority, some degree of social
inclusiveness was a necessary precondition for a well-functioning democracy”); Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1534–35 (1988) (“Just as property rights—
rights of having and holding material resources—become, in a republican perspective, a
matter of constitutive political concern as underpinning the independence and authenticity of
the citizen’s contribution to the collective determinations of public life, so is it with the
privacies of personal refuge and intimacy.” (footnote omitted)).
102. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
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viewing the invocation of rights to deny the usual deference to the
legislature reflects a view that a democratic process denying these rights
is not a properly operating democratic process and thus not deserving of
democratic deference. As this suggests, the invocation of rights claims
allows the presumption of validity to be rebutted either by showing that
democratic legitimacy is non-dispositive in light of the constraints
imposed by other values or that the rights violation itself demonstrates
103
that the political process is democratically flawed.
Of course, judicial deference is not absolute even outside these
rights contexts, and legislation must also meet minimal requirements of
basic rationality, a standard that appears to have its sharpest bite in
104
cases of animus.
This requirement confirms that deference to
democracy only goes so far. In sum, democratic accountability serves as
a presumptively sufficient legitimating resource, a presumption
superseded or rebutted by claimed violations of rights. And, where that
presumption is overcome, courts evaluate state action on metrics of both
means and ends.
2. You Can’t Do That: Structural Claims
Claims that the “wrong” governmental actor was responsible for the
challenged action arise in settings of structural constitutional law, such
as separation of powers or federalism contexts, as well as in
administrative law. This issue of the wrong actor making decisions
presents a concern about a “democratic deficit,” the idea that power is
105
being exercised outside of settings subject to democratic control. In a

1132 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay organizational
structure, but to deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but to empower them”).
103. These competing accounts of rights speak to varying political theory accounts as
well. For example, Corey Brettschneider notes that “[t]he view that a theory of basic rights
both has a root distinct from democracy and also constrains democracy is present in major
historical and contemporary accounts of liberalism” and opposes this view in “recast[ing] the
idea of substantive rights as an aspect of the democratic ideal.” COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER,
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 8–9 (2007).
104. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985).
105. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy
Deficit,” 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1351–54 (2010); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy
and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European
Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633 (1999) (noting that “[t]here is, one might say, a
basic ‘democratic deficit’ (to use a phrase that has gained wide currency in Europe) common
to both” delegation to administrative agencies and supranational institutions).
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number of settings, including judicial review, administrative action,
108
the use of international or foreign law in American courts, and
109
privatization of governmental functions, unelected actors exercise (or
are thought to exercise) forms of governance, giving rise to concerns
110
about democratic legitimacy. The wrong actor concern can also arise
across elected settings, questioning whether the state or federal
government may take a particular action or whether Congress or the
President may do so. Such questions often involve relative assessments
of democratic accountability as well as the proper execution of
111
government powers. Here too, ideals of accountability and democratic
legitimacy can play a role in the treatment of difficult cases.
Consider contexts involving elected actors.
Viewing the
Constitution as establishing a government of divided and enumerated
106. See infra text accompanying notes 116–120.
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 527, 529 (2003) (arguing that “because supranational lawmaking operates outside
[the constitutional] systems of checks and balances and accountability, it risks undermining
our Constitution’s institutional strategy”); cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Framers would, I
am confident, be appalled by the proposition that, for example, the American peoples’
democratic adoption of the death penalty, could be judicially nullified because of the
disapproving views of foreigners.” (citation omitted)).
109. See generally Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates,
Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 1 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (discussing questions
surrounding “the compatibility of the American outsourcing regime with the country’s
professed commitment to the democratic values of public participation, accountability,
transparency, and rule of law”).
110. Scholars have compared concerns about judicial review to those about
administrative law on this basis. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464–65
(2003) (analogizing shift in administrative law to preoccupation with the “countermajoritarian
difficulty” in constitutional law); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 540–41, 547–50 (1998) (relating concerns about judicial
review to concerns about independent agencies); Matthew D. Adler, Justification, Legitimacy,
and Administrative Governance, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 3, at 1 & n.3,
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1060&context=ils (noting that “Bickel
and Stewart attack the same general question: How to legitimate non-legislative governance,”
and crediting the insight to Professor Bressman (footnote omitted)).
111. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The Constitution thus
contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own
citizens.”). See generally V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 835 (2004) (developing account of structural constitutional claims, like separation of
powers and federalism, based on representational bases rather than formal or functional
assessment of powers).
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powers, the Court has often treated actions taken by actors to whom the
relevant power was not given as not merely presumptively improper, but
as categorically invalid. In separation of powers contexts, the Court
struck down the legislative veto and the line-item veto without allowing
the government to demonstrate that these democratically enacted
112
schemes were effective means of achieving compelling state interests,
as the government potentially could if the infringement were of a
113
right.
Indeed, in some instances the Court explicitly rejected
114
The Court has
functional defenses of the challenged framework.
likewise found legislation unconstitutional on the basis that it
commandeered state legislatures or executive officials, thereby
contravening the federal system, without allowing instrumental
115
justification.
In these cases, actions taken by actors not given the
relevant power by the Constitution were not given much deference,
despite the apparent desire of contemporary political actors to reshuffle
the allocation of powers.
In contexts where the state actor taking the relevant action is not
one with direct electoral accountability and thus putatively facing a
democratic deficit, courts have developed various models of
justification. The question of judicial review of legislative action has
116
famously raised this issue. The intuition is simple: when non-elected

112. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447–48 (1998); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
113. At other times, the Court has used a balancing model in this setting. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (noting that “the real question is whether the
removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform
his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (focusing inquiry “on the
extent to which [the challenged act] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions” and concluding that “[o]nly where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress”).
114. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (“No one can doubt that Congress
and the President are confronted with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented
magnitude, but ‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.’” (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944)).
115. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of
Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 200 (noting that in Printz, “[t]he Court announced a
categorical anti-commandeering rule, one not subject to any case-by-case balancing of
interests or measurement of burden”).
116. See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16 (developing the concept of countermajoritarian
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judicial actors strike down decisions enacted by elected representatives,
117
the polity suffers a democratic harm.
Multiple responses to this
concern have been advanced, which roughly track the reasons for
protections of individual rights and structural provisions more generally:
118
that judicial review in practice is not actually countermajoritarian, that
judicial review is democracy-promoting because it supports democratic
119
commitments, and that in protecting rights, judicial review protects
120
crucial values in addition to democracy.
These accounts legitimate
judicial review as consistent with democratic values or, alternatively, as
following from external values that can trump democracy in particular
settings. In the next Part, I examine the structure of analysis used in
administrative law doctrine, a setting which poses its own challenges to
democratic commitments.
B. The Administrative Law Model
Against this backdrop, I turn to administrative law to assess how
these democratic concerns play out in this setting. In this Part, I discuss
a variety of legal doctrines that shape a response to the lack of
121
presumptive democratic legitimacy of agency action.
To summarize
difficulty); see also Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61, 65
(2008) (“The countermajoritarian difficulty is probably the dominant theme in contemporary
legal scholarship about judicial review.”).
117. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1353 (2006) (“By privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and
unaccountable judges, [judicial review] disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside
cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues
about rights.”); see also BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 103, at 142 (criticizing substantive
accounts for “fail[ing] to recognize that there is a loss to democracy every time a
nonmajoritarian institution is needed to protect substantive democratic rights”).
118. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 14 (2009) (arguing that “over time, as Americans have the opportunity to
think through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the
considered judgment of the American people”).
119. See, e.g., BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 103, at 136–59 (developing an argument
that judicial review is sometimes justified as a means of protecting democratic rights); ELY,
supra note 11, at 73–104 (arguing that judicial review can reinforce representation).
120. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 116, at 105–06 (arguing that judicial review serves as a
means of holding government subject to higher law).
121. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (2008) (“The overriding purpose behind
almost every doctrine in administrative law is to control the exercise of agency discretion.”);
Bressman, supra note 110, at 462 (“From the birth of the administrative state, we have
struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional
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the discussion that follows, courts have sought to trade off some direct
popular control for some effective governance, demanding frameworks
promoting accountability to the legislature, the executive, and the
people, along with the demonstrated exercise of instrumental
knowledge by administrative agencies. My goal here is to trace the
broad structure of administrative law and frame it in a way that can
provide guidance for the election law setting. I therefore center my
discussion on administrative law doctrines of governmental structure
and rulemaking, as these best highlight the ways the federal courts have
treated democratic values in this setting.
The concern about discretion exercised by unelected administrative
officials extends beyond courts. Rachel Barkow has illustrated how the
demise of ideas of mercy in criminal law traces to the development of
122
the administrative state and anxieties about unaccountable discretion.
Likewise, the rise of cost–benefit analysis as a “technology of trust”
speaks to the strong incentive to justify administrative decisions in
123
objective terms. In these settings, concerns about discretion shape the
nature and content of administrative decisions before they reach the
courts (if they ever do). Indeed, similar concerns about discretion and
case-by-case decisionmaking have been advanced with regard to the
124
courts themselves,
and the longstanding rules–standards debate
likewise rests in part on a divide over the propriety of administrative
125
and judicial discretion.
democracy.”); Lindseth, supra note 105, at 645 (explaining that administrative rulemaking “is
inescapably problematic from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy” both because
“administrative agencies do not derive their power directly from a constitutional delegation of
legislative authority from the people” and because “agencies do not depend directly on
periodic popular approval—that is, they do not depend directly on the vote—for their
continuing legitimacy”).
122. See Barkow, supra note 121, at 1334–35.
123. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY
IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 90 (1995) (arguing that “[r]igorous quantification is demanded
in these contexts[, including cost–benefit analysis,] because subjective discretion has become
suspect” and that “[m]echanical objectivity serves as an alternative to personal trust”).
124. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]here is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case,
rather than adhering to the legal principle”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989) (arguing that courts should adopt rules rather
than follow a case-by-case approach).
125. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992) (noting, in discussing the Court’s treatment of rules and
standards, that “[r]ules, once formulated, afford decisionmakers less discretion than do
standards”).

10-ZIPKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

670

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 2:06 PM

[95:641

In response to such concerns about discretion and accountability,
administrative law doctrine structures an elaborate model that
legitimates administrative action through four means: (1) tracing agency
action to a legislative directive (that is, explained in terms of a
legislatively imposed principle); (2) subjecting the action to the
oversight and accompanying democratic accountability of the executive
branch; (3) reaching the decision pursuant to processes characterized by
transparency, inclusion, and public responsiveness; and (4) defending
agency action on the basis of demonstrated expert judgment. The first
three reflect a three-pronged model of democratic accountability, while
the fourth promotes the ideal of effective governance. Importantly,
each of these doctrines reflects a balance between the demands of
democracy and effective governance in a particular setting; as a result,
each element is not only a component, but also itself a microcosm, of the
larger administrative law model.
Administrative law doctrine thus reflects a broad framework in
which democratic accountability is promoted and departures from
directly democratic procedures are justified to the extent that
126
corresponding gains in effectiveness can be shown.
In short, “[t]he
task of administrative law is to generate institutional designs that
appropriately balance the simultaneous demands of political
127
responsiveness, efficient administration, and respect for legal rights.”
I focus here on the calibration of the first two of these, exploring the
intricate trade-offs designed to maximize these two commitments, which
can be in some tension. As I suggest below, the variety of tools used to
shore up the democratic legitimacy of administrative action may
likewise provide guidance for debates about the legitimacy of political
actors regulating the electoral process.

126. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 399–408
(2006) (discussing administrative accountability model and explaining that the model
“regulates decisionmaking to promote rationality, responsiveness to public norms, and
reviewability by others”).
127. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263–64 (2006); see also CHRISTOPHER F.
EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY
3 (1990) (identifying three models of decisionmaking: “adjudicatory fairness, politics, and
‘scientific’ expertise”).
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1. Democratic Governance
In significant part, administrative law doctrine seeks to ensure the
democratic legitimacy of agency action by demanding multiple forms of
attribution, accountability, oversight, and participation by elected
representatives and the people themselves. Here, I describe the ways
the doctrine tracks agency action to the legislature, the executive, and
the public. This three-pronged framework appears almost Madisonian
in the way it disperses powers, and includes an element of popular
participation as well, which we might view as an acknowledgement of
the democratic deficit that administrative law entails and as an attempt
128
to bolster its legitimacy. I do not evaluate in this Article the precise
balance between these three elements, or the different models of
representation they allow for and create; rather, my goal is to highlight
the development, through judicial elaboration of the Constitution and
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), of a doctrinal model designed to
minimize the perceived democratic deficit in this setting.
a. Legislative Accountability
Administrative law directs political decisions to democratically
accountable actors through the nondelegation doctrine. This doctrine,
stemming from the vesting of the “Legislative Powers” in Congress by
129
Article I of the Constitution, is commonly seen to be in a state of
130
desuetude, as the Supreme Court has only used it to strike down two
statutes (technically, two parts of the same statute) in its history, both in
131
1935. Proponents of a robust doctrine see the limitation on delegation

128. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 214–30 (2002) (arguing for model of administrative rulemaking
consistent with ideal of rule by the people).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 588
(2010) (remarking on “the nondelegation doctrine’s descent into desuetude in the area of
administrative law”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (observing
that “[s]ince the effective demise of the original nondelegation doctrine in 1935, the Court has
searched for ways to assuage its abiding worry about broad delegations”).
131. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–30 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air
Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 332 (1999) (referring to 1935 as “the
nondelegation doctrine’s only good year”).
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132

as a means of protecting democratic ideals, in contrast to those who
view delegation as necessary for effective governance or as more
133
consistent with democratic values. On its terms, the doctrine requires
that delegations to agencies be made pursuant to an “intelligible
134
principle,”
thereby denying the agency the authority to make
fundamental political decisions itself. In doing so, the doctrine formally
distributes political authority to the legislature and limits agencies to
instrumental decisions predicated on the legislatively provided principle.
Though the Court has approved numerous delegations in which the
intelligible principle is rather capacious (the FCC’s authority to regulate
135
broadcasting “in the public interest” is one example ), the doctrine may
still do some work in shaping agency action. For example, while the
Court has indicated that it will assess the presence of an intelligible
principle based on its own reading of the statute, without regard to the
136
agency’s explanation, the realities of litigation demand that the agency
be able to argue to the Court in those terms, likely affecting the agency’s
137
rulemaking practice. In doing so, the doctrine constructs a model of

132. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine
“ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will”); ELY, supra note 11, at 131–33; David Schoenbrod,
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 732 (1999)
(discussing “the harm that delegation does to democracy”).
133. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152–57 (1997) (noting that “it may make sense to imagine
the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the
responsiveness of government to the desires of the general electorate”); Peter H. Schuck,
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 776
(1999) (contending that “delegation—when backed (as it is in our system) by many powerful
institutional and informal controls over agency discretion—constitutes one of the most
salutary developments in the long struggle to instantiate the often competing values of
democratic participation, political accountability, legal regularity, and administrative
effectiveness”).
134. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
135. See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (citing this as example of broad delegation);
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–27 (1943) (upholding this delegation
against constitutional challenge).
136. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472–73 (“Whether the statute delegates legislative power
is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the
answer.”).
137. Professor Strauss advanced a similar argument prior to the American Trucking
decision. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
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means-ends reasoning, distinguishing the principle that must be
attributed to Congress from the agency’s authority to decide how to
138
attain that goal.
Notwithstanding the apparent impossibility of
allocating decisions about ends to the legislature and ensuring the
139
agency makes only means decisions, by demanding that divide and
thereby requiring that administrative action be defended by the agency
and approved by the courts on those terms, the nondelegation doctrine
shapes a model of legislative accountability for the ends of agency
actions.
Scholars have explored the ways in which nondelegation ideals take
shape in subconstitutional form.
Cass Sunstein argues that
nondelegation values are furthered through canons of statutory
140
construction, while Lisa Schultz Bressman explores the Court’s
promotion of decisionmaking through the democratic process in
141
performing the Chevron analysis. These discussions, and the Court’s
decisions that underlie them, speak to the bluntness of the
nondelegation doctrine as a tool for promoting democratic
accountability to the legislature. But the broader goal remains: through
administrative law, courts seek to ensure that agency action is
attributable to ends decisions made through the democratically
accountable legislative process.
b. Executive Accountability
The democratic underpinnings of administrative action are likewise
supported by their connection to the democratic accountability of the
executive. In particular, the treatment of the appointment and removal
powers shapes an administrative structure responsive to a popularly

Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442–43 (1989).
138. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 982 (3d ed. 2000)
(“The open-ended discretion to choose ends is the essence of legislative power; it is this
power which Congress possesses but its agents necessarily lack and with which its agents
could not be endowed by mere legislation.”).
139. See RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 116–18.
140. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2000); see
also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 223–24 (criticizing this approach).
141. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
764 (2007); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 459–60 (2002) (arguing for the
enforcement of values of the nondelegation doctrine through administrative law rather than
constitutional law).
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elected President. In the appointments setting, Congress is denied the
142
power to appoint administrative officials (though the Senate is given
143
an advise-and-consent role ) in order to ensure a direct line of
144
The removal power, unaddressed by the
democratic accountability.
145
constitutional text, presents a more complex framework. While the
Supreme Court originally indicated that the executive needed an
exclusive removal power, even for the postmaster of Portland,
146
Oregon, in order to ensure effective execution of the laws, it later
approved “independent” agencies whose heads may be removed only
147
for cause, limiting the President’s removal authority and, at least in an
148
idealized way, the agency’s democratic responsiveness. This reasoning
reflects a vision of effective administration: that some decisions, as
specified by Congress, should be made apolitically. The doctrine allows
149
the President’s removal power to be limited but not transferred, an
echo of the larger effort to balance democratic accountability and
effective administration.
Recently, a closely divided Court recalibrated this balance. In Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
plaintiffs challenged the structure of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), an entity comprised of five members
removable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only for
150
cause. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down

142. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127–28 (1976) (per curiam).
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
144. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991) (“The Framers understood,
however, that by limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded it
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”).
145. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is, of
course, no provision in the Constitution stating who may remove executive officers, except
the provisions for removal by impeachment.”).
146. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926).
147. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
148. But see Strauss, supra note 14, at 596 (arguing that “any assumption that executive
agencies and independent regulatory commissions differ significantly or systematically in
function, internal or external procedures, or relationships with the rest of government is
misplaced”).
149. See id. at 614 (explaining that when Congress asserts a role in removal, “[i]t has not
only limited the President’s ordinary political authority by imposing a ‘for cause’ requirement,
but also greatly expanded its own political authority by insisting on a voice in that
determination,” thus “defeat[ing] any claim that the measure has an apolitical end such as
assuring objectivity”).
150. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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the for-cause limitation largely because it compromised the agency’s
democratic accountability. The Court noted that “[t]he diffusion of
151
power carries with it a diffusion of accountability,” and that “[w]ithout
a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot ‘determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of
152
pernicious measures ought really to fall.’” The Court thus concluded
that “[b]y granting the Board executive power without the Executive’s
oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment
153
on his efforts.”
In short, without the removal power, “the President
could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own
154
responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.” This framing is
reminiscent of the Court’s decision in New York v. United States, in
which the Court advanced a similar argument about the public’s
inability to ensure democratic accountability where the federal
155
government was seen to “commandeer” state government.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund strikes a different
balance in seeking to promote effective governance. He emphasizes
that “to free a technical decisionmaker from the fear of removal without
cause can similarly help create legitimacy with respect to that official’s
regulatory actions by helping to insulate his technical decisions from
156
nontechnical political pressure.”
On this account, premised on the
characterization of administrative responsibility as primarily
“technical,” direct democratic accountability is not only unnecessary but
potentially harmful, and it is abstention from political considerations
that builds legitimacy. This point is confirmed by Justice Breyer’s
challenge that “in a world in which we count on the Federal
Government to regulate matters as complex as, say, nuclear-power
production, the Court’s assertion that we should simply learn to get by
‘without being’ regulated ‘by experts’ is, at best, unrealistic—at worst,

151. Id. at 3155.
152. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3164.
155. 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (emphasizing that “where the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the
electoral ramifications of their decision”).
156. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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157

dangerously so.”
To the extent we view administrative action as
primarily expertise-intensive decisions like nuclear-power production or
auditing standards (and assuming we view even those settings as more
158
expertise-intensive than values-reflecting ), it follows that the Court’s
decision “will create an obstacle, indeed pose a serious threat, to the
proper functioning of that workable Government that the Constitution
159
seeks to create.”
The Court’s contrary conclusion envisions agency
160
activity as political and thus demands greater democratic oversight.
This divide between opposing accounts of the balance between
democratic accountability and effective governance—in the Free
161
Enterprise Fund opinions’ terms, between “democratic government”
162
and “workable government” —presents the debate about
administrative action in miniature: how do we balance political
considerations, reflecting the will of the people, and the rule of experts,
putatively independent of popular will, in governing? The Free
Enterprise Fund decision—and rhetoric—pushes this balance in the
direction of popular accountability.
This framework aligns with the model of administrative law shaped
by the nondelegation doctrine, which likewise seeks to track political
accounts of administrative action back to democratically accountable
actors. From a pro-delegation perspective, Jerry Mashaw argues that
administrators should make political decisions “as a device for
facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential
163
elections.” Then-Professor Elena Kagan’s argument that presidential
involvement in agency decisionmaking should insulate against a
challenge based on the nondelegation doctrine presents a similar
account, premised on the increased accountability that presidential

157. Id. at 3175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 3156).
158. See PORTER, supra note 123, at 51 (“We must be wary of dismissing [accounting] as
routine and unoriginal. The reputation of accounts and statistics for grayness helps to
maintain their authority. Considered as a social phenomenon, accounting is much more
powerful and problematical than scholars and journalists generally realize.”).
159. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 3156 (stating that the concern about popular control “is largely absent from
the dissent’s paean to the administrative state”).
161. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
162. Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court))).
163. MASHAW, supra note 133, at 152.
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164

involvement provides.
Taken together, the nondelegation doctrine
and the appointment and removal doctrines are complementary in
preserving multiple sources of accountability, reflecting commitments to
the selection of ends and oversight of the selection of means through
elected officials.
c. Popular Accountability
Administrative law does not rely solely on representative forms of
democratic accountability to promote legitimacy, but on frameworks
promoting popular accountability as well, most prominently through
notice and comment procedures for administrative rulemaking. These
procedures, set out in the Administrative Procedure Act and further
developed by the federal courts, promote public input and oversight
over administrative action through publicity, disclosure, and
165
responsiveness requirements. They thereby present a separate means
of promoting democratic legitimacy, providing the public the
opportunity and capacity to participate in the rulemaking process and to
some extent dispelling the specter of secretive bureaucrats cooking up
166
rules in their lair.
Much as when balancing legislative or executive
oversight with agency expertise, courts have sought in this setting as well
to calibrate responsiveness with the demands of workable agency
procedures.
The notice and comment process comprises three primary elements.
167
First, the agency must provide notice of the rule it seeks to enact, a
publicity requirement for agency rulemaking, but one with some edge
based on the judicial insistence that the ultimately enacted rule conform

164. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2369.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting forth requirements for informal rulemaking).
166. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (arguing that “although the Congress, the President, and
the courts retain an important reviewing function, having administrative agencies set
government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for
deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity”). Participation by
nongovernmental actors takes other forms as well in the administrative setting. See, e.g., Orly
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (discussing development of a “new
governance model [that] supports the replacement of the New Deal’s hierarchy and control
with a more participatory and collaborative model, in which government, industry, and
society share responsibility for achieving policy goals”).
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
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168

to the publicized rule.
Second, the agency must supply the
169
information relied upon in its development of the proposed rule. This
serves as a disclosure requirement, on the theory that “[t]o suppress
meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is
170
akin to rejecting comment altogether.”
Consistent with this
requirement, Peter Strauss has suggested that the provisions of the
171
Freedom of Information Act, codified into the APA, help promote
172
these disclosure interests as well. Finally, the agency must respond to
relevant comments in the statement of basis and purpose that must
173
accompany the final rule, a responsiveness requirement that ensures
174
that the public’s input is not solicited and then ignored.
Together,
these requirements of publicity, disclosure, and responsiveness promote
175
a more publicly responsive framework within the rulemaking process.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of courts to
add additional procedural requirements wholly beyond those set out by
168. See, e.g., Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that “if the final rule materially alters the issues involved in the rulemaking or . . .
if the final rule ‘substantially departs from the terms or substance of the proposed rule,’ the
notice is inadequate” (quoting Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 702 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980))).
169. See Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236–37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It
would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies upon which an agency relies in
promulgating a rule must be made available during the rulemaking in order to afford
interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for comment.”).
170. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
172. See Peter L. Strauss, Statutes That Are Not Static—The Case of the APA, 14
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 785–87, 796–98 (2005).
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.”).
174. See Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252–53.
175. For some concerns about notice and comment practice, see David J. Barron &
Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231–32 (noting
that “[a]s practiced in the shadow of the courts, notice and comment often functions as
charade”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 178 (1997) (arguing that “[a]
threshold amount of participation is necessary to deliberative decisions, but at some point
participation creates significant institutional costs for deliberative administrative process”);
and Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96–97, 157–62 (2003) (criticizing APA model and advocating
alternative based on instrumental rationality). For discussion of the actual operation of the
notice and comment process, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (2005) (finding that the public does participate,
in a somewhat useful and influential way, in the regulatory process, and suggesting
improvements).
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176

the legislature (or at least those arguably stemming from legislative
directive), further calibrating the delicate balance between elected and
non-elected actors.
Political theorist Bryan Garsten has argued that “a chief purpose of
representative government is to multiply and challenge governmental
177
claims to represent the people,” an effort supported by the multiple
lines of democratic accountability drawn by administrative law doctrine.
These frameworks—tracing political decisions back to legislative
delegation, ensuring oversight by the executive, and promoting popular
input and oversight in rulemaking—combine and contend to advance
democratic values within the administrative context.
Given the
challenge of squaring decisions made by agency officials with the basic
account of democracy, this mixture of procedural, substantive, and
structural demands fosters the maximization of democratic ideals in this
setting.
2. Expert Governance
Alongside these responses to democratic concerns, judicial review
simultaneously serves to justify the delegation to the agency by ensuring
that any democratic deficits are compensated for by the agency’s
exercise of expert knowledge. The basic question here is why agency
action is permitted at all unless the agency is doing something that the
legislature could not do itself. Administrative law, largely through the
“hard look” doctrine, strives to ensure that the agency take action on
the basis of expertise and instrumental judgment, rather than for
political or arbitrary reasons. This doctrinal framework encompasses
three elements: a requirement that the challenged action be defended
on the basis on which it was originally promulgated; a heightened level
of skepticism in review; and a demand for instrumental rather than
political justification for agency action. Together, these elements of
judicial review shape the agency as an actor legitimated through its

176. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978).
177. Bryan Garsten, Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty, in POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION 91 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Bruce A.
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1028 (1984)
(arguing that, on the model of representation developed in The Federalist Papers, “the
separation of powers operates as a complex machine which encourages each official to
question the extent to which other constitutional officials are successfully representing the
People’s true political wishes”).
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exercise of expertise.
In SEC v. Chenery Corp., the Supreme Court ruled that “an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
178
action can be sustained.” This rule limits the agency to defending the
challenged action on the basis it relied on in enacting it, rather than any
post hoc sources of support. Kevin Stack has argued that the Chenery
rule presents another face of the nondelegation doctrine, requiring the
179
agency to connect its action back to the statutory delegation.
By
forcing the agency to supply and then rely upon reasons in reaching
decisions, the Chenery doctrine structures the agency as an actor
accountable not only on the basis of institutional legitimacy or
procedural propriety but also on the basis of defensible reasons. The
doctrine further ensures that those reasons are not merely plausible, but
actually reflect the originally stated basis for the action.
This
combination promotes the democratic bona fides of the administrative
system by ensuring that delegations can only be justified when the
agency can defend its exercise of the delegated power with reference to
the original delegation.
Though the pre-APA form of review of administrative action was
180
not very skeptical, courts now apply a more searching form of review
181
Judge Merrick
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.
Garland has observed that the Court’s decision in the State Farm case
shaped a substantive hard look doctrine, in which judicial scrutiny
182
exceeds that traditionally given legislative action.
This trend has
continued: as Gillian Metzger has noted, “It is generally accepted, at
least by scholars, that ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review under State Farm
is a far cry from the lenient scrutiny originally intended by the Congress
183
that enacted the APA.”
In short, not only the form of inquiry, but

178. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
179. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
958, 992–1004 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he Chenery principle operates both to bolster the
political accountability of the agency’s action and to prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s
exercise of its discretion”).
180. See, e.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
181. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
182. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 545–
49 (1985).
183. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010).
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also the level of deference given in pursuing that inquiry, differs from
that given challenges to legislative action, indicating a model of
compensating for democratic deficits by ensuring the effectiveness of
184
administrative governance.
Most significantly for this discussion, the hard look model defines
judicial review in terms of what the court requires the agency to
demonstrate in order to defend the challenged action. In the words of
the State Farm Court, the agency action must be vacated if the agency
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
185
agency expertise.
The agency is required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
186
between the facts found and the choice made.”
In short, the courts
“will take a hard look at the quality of the agency’s overall decision
187
making” and will demand that the agency demonstrate the quality of
its decision through reasoned explanation.
This inquiry funnels political decisions to elected rather than
administrative actors by denying the agency the ability to defend the
188
challenged action on the basis of political considerations.
While the
189
Court has in some cases accommodated political decisions, it indicated

184. Cf. Berger, supra note 89, at 5–9 (arguing that deference given to administrative
agencies in constitutional cases should take into account the political and epistemic authority
of the agency in that setting).
185. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
186. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
187. Rubin, supra note 175, at 140.
188. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 88 (“State Farm is expertise-forcing in the sense that the
Court expects the agency to make discretionary policy decisions that can be justified by the
relevant statutory factors, and not politics.”); Garland, supra note 182, at 542–49 (discussing
State Farm holding).
189. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(indicating that “[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices”); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of
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in Massachusetts v. EPA that political considerations remain an
insufficient basis for decision, concluding that the EPA had not
adequately justified its approach to the regulation of greenhouse gasses
190
under the statutory factors.
In permitting the agency to invoke only
instrumental considerations when defending an enacted rule, the
arbitrary and capricious requirement channels agency justifications, in
the words of Professors Freeman and Vermeule, “from politics to
191
expertise.” Scholars have concluded from these and other recent cases
that “hard look review prioritizes expertise and technocratic
decisionmaking within the agency, in the process downplaying more raw
192
political considerations,” and that these decisions are “expertiseforcing” in their attempt “to ensure that agencies exercise expert
193
judgment free from outside political pressures.”
In shaping this demanding oversight, hard look review of rulemaking
serves to shore up democratic legitimacy by ensuring the agency’s
exercise of expertise. Professor Mashaw explains:
As Max Weber noted long ago, the legitimacy of
bureaucratic action resides in its promise to exercise power on
the basis of knowledge.
Administrative legitimacy flows
primarily from a belief in the specialized knowledge that
administrative decisionmakers can bring to bear on critical
policy choices. And the only evidence that this specialized
knowledge has in fact been deployed lies in administrators’
194
explanations or reasons for their actions.
Here again, administrative law doctrine balances democratic and
Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130–31 (2010) (discussing this issue and
advocating greater transparency, including disclosure of executive influence); Kathryn A.
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8
(2009) (arguing for judicial acceptance of political considerations in reviewing agency action).
190. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–34 (2007); Freeman & Vermeule, supra
note 188, at 83–92 (advancing this reading of the case).
191. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 188, at 51.
192. Metzger, supra note 183, at 492; see also Watts, supra note 189, at 19 (“Ever since
State Farm, courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious review routinely have demanded more
than mere minimum rationality, and they have searched agency decisions to ensure they
represent expert-driven, technocratic decisionmaking.”).
193. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 188, at 52.
194. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States,
and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 117 (2007) (footnote
omitted).
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expertise means of legitimation.
Hard look review is not the only means of promoting an expertisebased justification for agency action, as the structure of notice and
comment rulemaking is likewise seen to play an epistemic role. The
Second Circuit has explained that “[w]hen the basis for a proposed rule
is a scientific decision, the scientific material which is believed to
support the rule should be exposed to the view of interested parties for
their comment. One cannot ask for comment on a scientific paper
195
without allowing the participants to read the paper.”
This account
treats notice and comment procedures as a means of accessing the
196
expertise of the public, and requires that the APA procedures be
followed in such a way to best achieve such results. Here too,
administrative law doctrine promotes the maximization of exercised
knowledge, shaping the trade-off between values of democracy and
effective governance.
197
We can read the Chevron doctrine to support this account as well.
198
Even if we call it “interpretation,” agencies do not approach statutory
interpretation the same way courts do, but rather are filling in a
statutory ambiguity using the tools and expertise in which they
199
specialize.
Agencies may be better seen to be engaging in
specification, “a process whereby an end (or norm) is made more
200
specific.”
Put another way, on an ends-means framework, Congress
must supply the end (pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine) and the
agency must then determine the means (subject to hard look review).

195. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
196. For a fascinating account of this technique in classical Athens, see JOSIAH OBER,
DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
(2008).
197. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
198. See id. at 844 (invoking the “principle of deference to administrative
interpretations”).
199. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 118 (2008) (noting “the particular forms of administrative
decisionmaking through expertise, representation, and accountability—modes of inquiry
inaccessible to judges”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory
Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 519 (2005) (noting that
“[i]f both agencies and courts are doing their proper interpretive jobs, it would appear that
they should constantly disagree about interpretative method and, if method matters, about
meaning”); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 309
(2011) (arguing that “[c]hoosing interpretations from those allowed by a statute seem more
akin to policymaking than to divinations of statutory meaning”).
200. RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 104.
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Chevron speaks to the agency’s responsibility to “come up with more
201
concrete and specific interpretations of th[o]se ends” in the context at
issue. The doctrine requires that the end the agency is specifying was
actually left insufficiently concrete in the relevant setting (Step One)
and that the agency properly perform the process of end-specifying,
employing the required procedures and reaching a defensible result
(Step Two).
Chevron thus calibrates the sites of democratic
accountability by promoting specification in particular settings as an
exercise calling for the type of judgment engaged in by agencies rather
than that of courts, an approach based on responsiveness and expertise.
The Mead doctrine further promotes the protection of popular
democracy by providing that the presumptions underlying the Chevron
doctrine apply only when Congress has delegated to the agency to act
with the “force of law,” often through notice and comment
202
rulemaking. In doing so, Mead dictates that agency specifications will
be treated like means determinations only in the contexts most
compatible with democratic forms of oversight. Mead creates incentives
for agencies to engage in decisionmaking through processes that
promote public participation in order to obtain the higher level of
deference for the eventual agency action. While scholars have raised
doubts as to whether the different frameworks of review yield different
203
results in practice, the judicial structuring of the doctrine to promote
democracy-enhancing practices reflects the commitment to legitimating
agency action through democratic models.
In requiring agencies to defend their actions on the basis of
demonstrated rational judgment, while demanding politically
accountable sources of delegation and oversight, and encouragement of
and responsiveness to popular participation in promulgating rules,
administrative law seeks to funnel political decisions to democratically
accountable actors and expertise decisions to agencies. Administrative
law doctrine today thus reflects a blend of the three models identified by
Richard Stewart, the “transmission belt” model, the “expertise” model,
204
and the “interest representation” model. By simultaneously insisting
201. Id. at 105.
202. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
203. See, e.g., David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010)
(concluding that “the ‘reasonable agency’ standard is, increasingly clearly, the standard that
courts actually apply to all exercises of judicial review of administrative action, no matter
what standard they purport to use”).
204. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1671–88. As an alternative approach integrating such
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on adherence to legislatively dictated ends, accountability to the
executive, effective popular participation, and the exercise of
instrumental rationality as to means, the current framework of
administrative law strives to ensure the legitimacy of agency action by
mitigating some democratic deficits with effectiveness gains.
This model—imperfectly realized, to be sure—presents a recognition
of the benefits and dangers of agency action that is neither naïve nor
cynical: allowing the state to take advantage of specialized knowledge
while at the same time providing mechanisms of popular oversight and
limits on both the scope and domain of administrative action. More
generally, this model of administrative law responds to basic challenges
presented by democracy itself, seeking a balance between the demands
of consent-based, autonomy-regarding democratic government and
those of knowledge-driven, instrumentally effective, workable
government.
Administrative law reflects an attempt to embody and calibrate the
virtues and limitations of democratic governance in one doctrinal
setting. In doing so, it serves as a useful model of a judicial response to
a setting not characterized by the presumptively legitimate democratic
ideal, presenting a developed structural framework for validating state
action in the absence of such a presumption. While mindful of concerns
about the individual elements of the balance, I contend that the basic
model distinguishing political or ends decisions from instrumental or
means decisions and seeking to funnel the former to democratically
accountable actors while subjecting the latter to procedures reflecting
responsiveness to public input and requirements of exercised expertise
presents a viable approach for translating democratic values into law. I
turn now to consider the possibility of employing the insights of the
administrative law setting in the context of election law, another setting
in which our democratic values run up against the realities of political
governance.
representative or expertise-based accounts, Evan Criddle has advanced a fiduciary model of
administrative law. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 (2010) (arguing that
administrative law should “safeguard popular sovereignty in agency rulemaking by adopting a
fiduciary model of popular representation” (footnote omitted)); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 163 (2006) (“While legal theorists
have tended in the past to treat agency expertise, interest representation, and political
accountability as competing approaches to the problem of agency discretion, the fiduciary
model suggests that these elements should be integrated and coordinated to maximize agency
fidelity.” (footnote omitted)).
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IV. CONNECTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ELECTION LAW
Can administrative law provide useful guidance for election law? Is
the administrative law response to questions about democratic
legitimacy relevant in approaching those that arise in election law
contexts? The fact that the concerns can be grouped under the same
heading of course does not mean that they should be treated identically,
and these settings undoubtedly present different variables regarding the
role and capabilities of the federal courts. I nonetheless contend that
administrative law provides a useful model.
My claim is that a central concern of administrative law—the need to
ensure democratic legitimacy in the face of real-world governance by
state actors without a reliably effective accountability mechanism—
mirrors that at issue in election law. Further, I argue that the two
contexts demand similar models of governmental decisionmaking in
response. Just as agency officials’ lack of direct accountability to the
people yield administrative law requirements of reasoned decisions, the
nature of election law as both necessary for and embedded within the
democratic process likewise calls for demonstrations of both
responsiveness and effectiveness.
However, despite recurring
expressions of concern about self-serving regulation of the electoral
process, courts have not developed an effective means of approaching
this dynamic in the election law setting. Administrative law, with a
significant head start, has developed resources for confronting these
issues, and there is much to gain by understanding and adapting that
response.
I begin this Part by examining two differences between
administrative law and election law as a means of getting at the
connections between these two settings. These differences stem from
the distinct institutional settings in which concerns about accountability
emerge and the possibly varying role of the federal courts in responding
to these concerns. Establishing the precise ways in which administrative
law and election law may be seen to diverge will shed light on the
connections between them in terms of the concerns to which they
respond and the forms of decisionmaking they demand, which I address
in Part IV.B.
A. Differences
1. Accountability Through Elections
Though administrative law and election law both confront concerns
of democratic legitimacy, the precise nature of those concerns is
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somewhat different. Administrative law addresses a structure external
to a model of democratic legitimacy: the decisionmaker is unelected and
therefore unaccountable. We don’t need a robust account of democracy
to understand this basic concern. Election law, in contrast, confronts an
internal challenge, where an elected actor faces doubts about his or her
accountability based on some inadequacy of the election itself. The
difference is that between concerns about the identity of the
decisionmaker and the nature of the decision.
These two models could correspond to separate theoretical accounts
and practical concerns. We might believe that political actors are
inherently more democratically accountable than administrative actors,
even if elected from gerrymandered districts or with various distortions
of the electoral process, because those distortions may operate at the
margins, or may be of limited effect, and because, in extreme
circumstances, they will not protect the incumbent against a militant
205
electorate. Put simply, some election may be better than no election.
In contrast, agency officials are not undermining the electoral process,
but are acting outside that process altogether. We can debate which is
worse, at a principled or practical level, but the difference may counsel
distinct tactics in response.
On this point, consider two recent Supreme Court decisions decided
206
with roughly identical lineups: the partisan gerrymandering claim in
Vieth, and the separation of powers claim in Free Enterprise Fund, both
207
discussed above.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court ruled that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was not
sufficiently democratically accountable because its head could only be
removed for cause by the SEC, whose own leadership could

205. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In this
situation, as in others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be
to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like ours, relief must
come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people’s
representatives.”).
206. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, with Justice
Kennedy concurring in the judgment in a separate opinion that allowed for the possibility that
judicially manageable standards might one day appear. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court,
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice
Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter in dissent in the later case.
207. See supra notes 25–26, 150–162 and accompanying text.
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209

(presumably) only be removed for cause.
Conversely, the Court
concluded in Vieth that there were no judicially manageable standards
for finding the partisan Pennsylvania Congressional districting scheme
210
to be constitutionally problematic.
In reality, however, the PCAOB
may be more responsive to public will than the gerrymandered
211
legislature, especially to the extent that the carefully constructed
district lines dissuade any challenger from appearing and leave the
212
incumbent unopposed. If so, what work is the idea of accountability
doing here?
The juxtaposition of these decisions suggests a view in which the
existence of elections provides accountability, even if the nature of
particular elections and administrative government makes that unlikely
in the real world. The question of democratic legitimacy then turns on
what it means to be “accountable”—if all “accountable” means is that
the people can conceivably vote you out of office, there is no tension
here. This discussion presents a question similar to the familiar
213
formalist/functionalist divide in separation-of-powers law, here asking
whether we simply ensure that there is an election in order to satisfy the
concern for accountability or if we look behind the fact of the election to
ensure the system’s actual capacity for accountability. The difficulty the
Court has had in dealing with elections takes the form of a refusal to
214
pierce the veil of the election and assess its internal workings. Instead,
208. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3182–83
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How can the Court simply assume without deciding that the
SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only ‘for cause’? . . . It is certainly not
obvious that the SEC Commissioners enjoy ‘for cause’ protection.”).
209. Id. at 3164.
210. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305.
211. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600–03 (2010) (discussing ways in which independent
agencies are responsive to presidential preferences, focusing on contexts of financial policy).
212. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics:
Diminishing Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1121, 1125 (2007) (noting that “the effect of the [post-2000 Arkansas] redistricting was to
put a number of districts sufficiently out of competition so as to dissuade any effort by the
party out-of-power to even challenge the incumbent”).
213. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism
in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 29 (1998) (arguing that these
models are interconnected); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489
(1987) (discussing Court’s vacillating use of formal and functional approaches).
214. See Richard H. Pildes, Formalism and Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of
Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2003) (“A significant problem in this body of law, in
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the fact of elections is treated as ensuring sufficient accountability. On
this view, elected actors are democratically accountable and non-elected
actors are not. The quality of the election is not an issue for the courts.
216
But the mere existence of elections cannot be sufficient. We long
ago moved from an era of popular acclamation to one of actual
selection; democratic legitimacy nowadays demands a model of choice
217
rather than simply consent. And courts have been willing to look at
218
certain elements of the electoral process, as the doctrine has shown.
So it is not simply the presence of an election, but a broader judicial
hesitance to get involved in the electoral process that is at issue here.
The varying treatment of the administrative law and election law
settings must be defended on some more comprehensive theory of what
democratic commitments demand. In particular, we should consider the
ways in which the concepts of democratic accountability and
responsiveness operate differently in the contexts of the operation of
government and the selection of government. While the need to ensure
that administrative decisions are made subject to ideals of democratic
accountability might require removal power in the President or a
removable subordinate, and might demand a nondelegation doctrine,
and so forth, elections might inherently possess enough possibility for
accountability that there is less need for judicial monitoring. Even if the
theoretical commitments to democratic accountability are analogous,
those commitments play out differently in the different institutional
settings. The concern for accountability does not vanish, but must take
form in a manner fitted to the electoral setting.
Ultimately, the administrative law and election law models present
my view, is not that the Court has the wrong functional view of how democracy ought best be
understood; it is that the Court refuses to approach these issues in functional terms at all.
Instead, the law of democracy remains one of the last bastions of legal formalism in
constitutional law.”).
215. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), may serve as a useful example here. See
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at 670–74 (describing how, through Hawaii’s ban on
write-in ballots, a ban upheld by the Burdick Court, “a singularly powerful political party
used its control over the state electoral machinery to devise rules of engagement that
prevented internal defection”).
216. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., More Democracy: The Direct Primary and
Competition in U.S. Elections, 24 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 190, 190 (2010) (“Ever since the
spread of democratic norms in the nineteenth century, autocratic regimes also have resorted
to balloting to legitimize their rule, but only apologists endorse the results as ‘democratic.’”).
217. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 197–99
(1989) (discussing the move from acclamation to selection).
218. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 46 and accompanying text.
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varying manifestations of the same basic concern: that the
decisionmaker is not sufficiently accountable through democratic
219
processes and therefore need not be responsive to the public.
This
concern emerges straightforwardly in the administrative context, and
the election law setting presents the same dynamic to the extent we
recognize that our democratic demand is not for elections per se, but for
elections that foster accountability and responsiveness. The question
reduces to how we attain this ideal in the electoral setting. I return to
this point after considering another institutional difference.
2. Institutional Competence
As an analogue to the claim that the demands of accountability play
out differently in these settings, the institutional competence or
legitimacy of the courts might likewise be seen to vary in the different
contexts. On this account, courts may either be better able to monitor
administrative activity and deal with the democratic accountability
concerns arising in that setting than to engage with election law disputes,
or may act with more legitimacy in doing so. Accordingly, even if the
problems that arise are relevantly analogous, the courts can deal with
them better in one setting than the other for practical or institutional
reasons.
This concern can take a variety of forms. Administrative law claims
220
regularly involve the Administrative Procedure Act, providing a
statutory hook for decision, in contrast to election settings, which often
221
raise constitutional claims.
If courts tend to be more hesitant to
intervene in constitutional settings, where their decisions are not subject
222
to legislative overrule, than in statutory settings, administrative law
may not provide a useful model. Professor Metzger has suggested that
the Supreme Court has recently enforced federalism constraints through
frameworks of administrative law rather than constitutional
219. See HERZOG, supra note 217, at 207 (arguing that “responsiveness can serve as the
core of a theory of legitimacy, obligation, and disobedience” and that responsiveness “is also
. . . at the core of the consent of the governed; it’s what people are most deeply gesturing
toward when they invoke that phrase”); Charles, supra note 22, at 608 (“Under the standard
democratic account, the democratic ideal is responsiveness.”).
220. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
221. Of course, many election claims are statutory—for example, those involving the
Voting Rights Act—but those discussed in Part II rely largely on constitutional arguments.
222. Cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513–17 (2009)
(relying on questionable statutory construction to avoid deciding the constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
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223

adjudication, and a similar hesitance to directly engage constitutional
issues may be at work in this setting. The apparent shift in protecting
nondelegation principles through administrative law rather than
224
constitutional law speaks to this dynamic as well.
Likewise, election claims are unavoidably political, in multiple
senses. Decisions about the electoral process often present readily
discernible partisan valences, the same effects (or their mirror images)
that may be the motivation for the challenged provision in the first
place, and courts may hesitate to play the role of anointer. While
judicial decisions in the administrative setting can have partisan effects,
225
for example, if a particularly publicly salient regulation is struck down,
such decisions will rarely directly affect electoral outcomes. In contrast,
because challenges to electoral provisions are often advanced in the pre226
election period, the electoral effects may be particularly striking. The
very reasons for courts to skeptically review such provisions may then
equally provide reasons to stay out of the dispute.
A further difference may stem from remedial concerns. Where the
concern is that an unelected actor has exercised too much discretion, a
solution is apparent: ensure that the agency decision can be attributed to
227
an elected actor somewhere upstream. In contrast, if the issue is that
the election itself is somehow flawed, the remedy may be more
complicated, requiring the court to devise a change to the electoral
process that would solve the problem. Remedial ambivalence may be
playing a role here as well.
Finally, the target of inquiry in administrative law is often the agency
228
rather than Congress or a state actor. For basic separation of powers
and federalism reasons, federal courts may not only feel more
comfortable taking on an agency, a fellow non-elected actor, but may be
justified in doing so as a constitutional or theoretical matter because the
223. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J.
2023, 2027–28 (2008).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 140–141.
225. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007) (rejecting the Bush
Administration’s approach to global warming regulation).
226. See Zipkin, supra note 12, at 189 (discussing the pre-election posture of election
claims).
227. See Garland, supra note 182, at 586–90 (analyzing model of judicial review of
agency action as focused on “fidelity” to Congressional intent).
228. See Metzger, supra note 223, at 2054 (emphasizing relevance of the fact that
“[u]nder an administrative law framework, the Court’s scrutiny targets not Congress but
federal agencies”).
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agency is not a legislature, without all that goes along with that status.
The lower bar for vacating agency action, perhaps connected to the
courts’ knowledge of the ease with which a vacated action can be
repromulgated, may funnel judicial action to that setting and counsel
230
against it in the context of review of legislation.
In light of these factors, even if administrative law and election law
present identical concerns and raise similar demands, these demands
might still not be best enforced by courts, but left instead to the political
231
branches to enforce themselves.
Any approach modeled on the
administrative framework must therefore be attentive to the particular
considerations surrounding judicial review in the electoral setting.
B. Democratic Judgment
Both election law and administrative law present the problem of a
state actor who cannot be systematically trusted to act in the people’s
interests because of the lack of an effective accountability mechanism.
As a general matter, the legislature is presumed to be acting in the
people’s interests and the fact of a party-line vote is legally irrelevant. If
the Democrats all vote for a tax increase and the Republicans all vote
against, voters who feel strongly about the issue can express those views
at the polls. But when the PCAOB enacts a draconian auditing
regulation, there is no effective electoral recourse, just as it is difficult to
remove from office a legislator who draws the district lines to ensure
that no challenger is willing to enter the race and thus runs unopposed.
These settings leave tenuous the link between state action and
accountability for that action.
Crucially, the judicial response in the administrative law context is
neither to reject administrative action as illegitimate nor to bless it
following cursory review. Instead, courts have crafted an elaborate
framework, building on the Constitution and the APA, to balance and
channel ideals of democracy and expertise, with the aim of developing a
system sufficiently accountable and effective at governance to ensure

229. Cf. Waldron, supra note 117, at 1353–54 (noting that his argument against judicial
review only applies to review of legislative, rather than executive, actions).
230. See Metzger, supra note 183, at 532–33 (discussing ways in which “[a]dministrative
agencies . . . can respond to judicial reversal more easily than Congress”).
231. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (developing an account
of “judicially underenforced constitutional norms”).
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232

legitimacy.
In administrative law, concerns about democratic
accountability are treated as entitled to a rigorous and full judicial
response.
The recognition that the commitment to democratic accountability
can play out differently in the institutional setting of administrative
action from the context of crafting election provisions calls attention to
complex questions about the regulation of the democratic process. How
must decisions about the electoral process be made? As discussed, in
administrative law political decisions are disfavored and instrumentally
rational decisions are required, as a means of overcoming the
233
democratic deficit.
We should likewise ask whether elected political
actors can make decisions about the regulation of the electoral process
on a political basis. If so, self-dealing is to be expected and accepted. In
order to justify heightened judicial intervention, there must be some
basis for holding decisionmakers to a particular standard beyond
political will. In terms of the differences described in the previous Part,
questions about the judicial role are only relevant if we can identify a
substantive, constitutionally enforceable ideal to which to hold political
actors.
In a recent article, Nadia Urbinati highlights the distinction between
234
political judgment and judicial judgment.
She explains that while
“political judgment has generality (the general interest of the political
community at large) as its criterion,” judicial judgment “aims instead at
235
impartiality in evaluating a certain fact or a set of data or deeds.” This
distinction, which takes form in administrative law as the Londoner/Bi236
sees the hallmark of legislation largely in its
metallic divide,
237
abstraction from the particulars of any individual.
In contrast, the

232. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989) (“But the Court’s long struggle to
reconcile the growth of agencies with the Constitution yielded a solution far more complex
than carte blanche for Congress to give agencies whatever power it wishes them to have.”).
233. See supra Part III.B.
234. See Nadia Urbinati, Unpolitical Democracy, 38 POL. THEORY 65, 81–85 (2010).
235. Id. at 81.
236. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915);
Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 384–86 (1908).
237. See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 347 (2009)
(arguing that “[w]hatever its relevance in other functions of government, the abstraction that
representation involves is particularly appropriate for lawmaking, where what we are striving
to produce are abstract norms—abstract in the sense of general—rather than directives
focused on some particular person or situation”).
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requirements of adjudication demand that the judge not consider her
238
own interests in deciding the particular case on the basis of the law.
The legitimacy of each form of decisionmaking stems from these
characteristics, with proper adjudication dependent on independence
from the parties and with adherence only to the law, while legitimate
legislative action depends not on the content of the laws (within the
bounds imposed by constitutional rights) but on their having been
produced through proper means, their general applicability, and their
239
being subject to democratic revision.
Building on this framework, we can see administrative judgment to
incorporate a third model, that of expertise or applied knowledge, with
240
effectiveness, or instrumental rationality, as its primary criterion, a
model consistent with the historical development of administrative law
241
in America.
While this account of administrative judgment will
overlap with the judicial and legislative models, particularly insofar as
the agency is engaged in rulemaking or adjudication processes, it is
accompanied by the demand for instrumental judgment, distinguishing it
both from the rule of law focus of the judiciary and the leeway given
legislative actors to engage in political decisionmaking based on their
democratic pedigree. In short, as a state actor operating outside the
scope of direct democratic authorization or the representational
framework, agency decisions are held to a higher standard of rationality
in judgment as a means of legitimation.
The juxtaposition of these models presses the question of whether
decisions about the electoral process are to be made by the legislature
relative to its usual model of political judgment, or if the legislature is
238. See Urbinati, supra note 234, at 81–82.
239. Id. at 83–84 (indicating that “[t]he presumption of generality is essential to the
moral legitimacy of political decisions” and that “[o]penness to revision, rather than the
interruption or containment of democratic practices, is the democratic answer to
unsatisfactory democratic decisions”).
240. See Rubin, supra note 175, at 148–49 (noting that “according to Weber,
instrumental rationality is the dominant principle of modern bureaucratic government”).
241. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 406 (2007) (presenting historical
argument that the New Deal gave rise to a “prescriptive vision of how public policy should be
made” according to which “[t]he democratic process identified social problems at the most
general level” and “[i]t was then the job of experts to discern the best way to solve a
particular problem and implement the appropriate policy”); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 142–45 (1938) (arguing for deferential review of administrative
action based on “the belief that the expertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate
procedures, can be trusted to determine these issues as capably as judges”).
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held to a different standard of justification because of the tensions
inherent in the electoral setting. As discussed, election law doctrine
presently reflects a political model of judgment, with allowance for the
242
rule of law or judicial values implicated by voting rights commitments.
However, because of the character of provisions shaping the electoral
process as both prior to and demanding of democratic resolution, I
contend that democratic legitimacy demands something more than a
purely political decision in this setting. That something more is
administrative judgment’s demand for instrumental rationality,
reflecting a requirement that decisions about the electoral process be
made on the basis of promoting an effective and legitimate electoral
process rather than private interest. My claim is that decisions about the
electoral process call for the exercise of both political and administrative
judgment—a sort of “democratic judgment”—even when made by the
legislature.
Professor Urbinati explains that the main legitimator of political
judgment by legislators is the “openness to revision” of those
243
244
judgments, an account she attributes to Mill and Tocqueville. This
means of legitimation would require that the electoral process, as a
precondition of representation and the exercise of political judgment, be
structured to allow for such revision. Consistent with this model, the
demand for administrative judgment as to means serves both to further
the attainment of the politically determined ideals of the democratic
process and to ensure that the claimed ends are plausible and
appropriate, and, in doing so, mitigates the threats posed to democratic
values in these settings. Effectively, the nature of the legislature’s
decision as specifying procedures for its own election compromises
presumptive legitimacy to the level enjoyed by administrative officials
and calls for analogous justification in response.

242. See supra Part II.A.
243. Urbinati, supra note 234, at 84.
244. Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation,
28 POL. THEORY 758, 774 (2000) (“In his parliamentary speeches, Mill restated Tocqueville’s
idea that while democracies are ‘perpetually making mistakes, they are perpetually correcting
them too, and that the evil, such as it is, is far outweighed by the salutary effects of the
general tendency of their legislation.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, Representation of the
People [2] (Apr. 13, 1866), in PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES 66 (John M. Robson
& Bruce L. Kinzer eds., 1988))); see also 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 231 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (“The great privilege of the Americans does not
consist in being more enlightened than other nations, but in being able to repair the faults
they may commit.”).
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The account I borrow from Professor Urbinati stems from her
245
elucidation of a theory of representative democracy,
but it is
compatible with the demands of democracy on an array of procedural
accounts, such as a minimalist competition model or more demanding
representative or deliberative approaches. On these accounts, the
electoral process structures political decisionmaking, complicating any
246
Likewise, on
preference for political treatment of democracy itself.
substantive accounts of democratic requirements that emphasize the
outputs of the democratic process, decisions about the election process
designed to further purposes at odds with those the people would
choose or otherwise unexplainable on a public good account are
similarly problematic.
For these reasons, decisions about the electoral process shape a
hybrid model, ensuring the generality and popular will reflection that is
a hallmark of political decisions, while at the same time demanding the
sort of disinterested judgment premised on effectiveness that would
allow the continuing electoral process to function properly as a means of
legitimating political action. Adapting the administrative means-end
model to review decisions made by a political actor in this setting can
better ensure both sides of the political–instrumental commitment that
foster a truly democratic electoral process.
By invoking an ideal of instrumental effectiveness, I mean to set out
a model of identifying an effective means of reaching the politically
specified end through the application of practical knowledge. This
247
model, reminiscent of that described in the rights setting, but not
dependent on the trigger created by a particular individual who can
248
claim a severe burden,
reflects the need to look behind the
presumption of democratic legitimacy and to demonstrate the validity of
249
Requiring evidence of
the legislative decision more directly.
245. See generally NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES
(2006) (developing a theoretical account of representative democracy).
246. Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 52 (“Questions relating to boundaries and
membership seem in an important sense prior to democratic decision making, yet
paradoxically they cry out for democratic resolution.”).
247. See supra Part III.A.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71.
249. See Gunther, supra note 97, at 20–21 (suggesting a model of equal protection review
that “would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been
formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends”); see
also Garland, supra note 182, at 555 n.283 (observing that “the hard look is remarkably
similar to the test Gunther proposed for application in constitutional review”).
AND GENEALOGY
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instrumental rationality both avoids the circularity problem of decisions
about the electoral process being made by actors elected via that process
and justified with reference to that same process, and it simultaneously
promotes the administration of a fair and efficient electoral system. In
short, for elections to serve as a democratically legitimate model of
ensuring accountability, the elections must themselves be conducted on
250
a democratically legitimate basis. Viewing regulation of the electoral
process as not merely political but as instrumental as well will aid in
attaining that goal.
Though the question of whether this is the appropriate model for
political actors to follow in enacting provisions governing the electoral
process is distinct from the question whether the federal courts should
enforce any such requirement, the argument developed here speaks to
that point as well. To the extent the primary argument about the proper
model of decisionmaking in this setting is persuasive, it simultaneously
calls for extra-political enforcement, as it is premised on not fully
trusting political actors to make decisions governing the terms of their
own elections. This claim stems from ideals of both effectiveness and
democratic legitimacy. Whatever epistemic or institutional advantages
251
the democratic process generally confers,
those advantages are
unlikely to be realized in the context of political regulation of the
electoral process because the partisan or personal gains that certain
procedures can be expected to yield threaten to swamp considerations
252
based on expert knowledge directed to public ends.
Further, to the
250. See Charles, supra note 22, at 609 (noting that “in order for elections to fulfill their
purpose in a polity, they must be meaningful,” in other words, “their processes must provide
the opportunity for genuine contestation, and their outcomes must not be preordained by the
design of institutional structures”).
251. See John Ferejohn, The Lure of Large Numbers, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1969–70
(2010) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE
FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009); and ADRIAN
VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009)) (describing the “many-minds”
arguments made by both authors, according to which “the popular branches may sometimes
enjoy an informational advantage over the courts, insofar as they take account of the
judgments of a wide range of people in making decisions; this advantage, other things being
equal, may lead them to produce better decisions”).
252. See id. at 1995 (explaining, in response to the “many-minds” arguments for judicial
deference to the political branches, that “[t]o the extent that experts have different
preferences than their nonexpert superiors, their bosses are less likely to accept their advice
and the overall quality of decisions will be reduced”). As Professors Levinson and Pildes
highlight, the realities of partisan competition have undermined the Madisonian ideal of
separation of powers as well. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006) (contending that “[t]he success of
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extent we privilege decisions made by political actors over those by
courts because of their democratic pedigree and so grant a broad
presumption of constitutional validity, that presumption applies less
strongly, if at all, in this setting because of the content of the decision as
shaping the terms of election going forward. As a result, despite the
hesitations about judicial oversight described above, courts must play a
role in this setting in holding political decisionmakers to the demands of
democratic governance of the electoral process.
As this suggests, the substantive framework of election regulation
demands judicial oversight, not as an exclusive province of courts, but
on a shared basis with political actors. Much as the administrative law
setting provides a framework of judicial review but with a general
posture of deference as to substance, incorporating a means-ends model
in the electoral setting would leave ends decisions to political actors
operating within constitutional bounds while overseeing the exercise of
instrumental rationality in effectuating the desired ends in practice.
Such a model could limit the concerns about judicial competence in this
setting, especially as to remedies, evaluating the actions taken by
political actors on the familiar means-ends dimension rather than
seeking some optimal model of democratic practice. In short, the
administrative law model of ensuring a democratic source for
administrative action and allowing the tradeoff for the exercise of
knowledge in effective governance presents a valuable paradigm for the
electoral setting.
V. AN ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL FOR ELECTION LAW
The complex and intricate approach to ensuring democratic
legitimacy in the administrative law setting presents a model for a
similar approach in the election law context. I do not argue for the
administrative law model to be transported intact to election law nor
develop a full doctrinal account of an idealized approach to election
cases. Rather, I elaborate in this Part how the tools employed by the
Court as a means of responding to these legitimacy concerns in one
setting might provide guidance for a judicial response in the electoral
context.

American democracy overwhelmed the Madisonian conception of separation of powers
almost from the outset,” and that “[a]s competition between the legislative and executive
branches was displaced by competition between two major parties, the machine that was
supposed to go of itself stopped running”).
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The move I draw on in the administrative law context is the
framework of means-ends reasoning and the funneling of ends, or
political, decisions to democratically accountable actors, and ensuring
that means, or instrumental, decisions are made on the basis of
exercised expertise. My focus is therefore on the combination of
political and administrative judgment that broadly characterizes
administrative law. Before addressing the specifics, I will say a few
things about this framework as a model.
I recognize that the distinction between means and ends can be
253
theoretically tenuous and difficult to fully specify in practice.
It is
nonetheless a useful construct in articulating the proper division of
responsibility and authority between elected actors and agencies, as well
as providing content for the idea of expertise. Making decisions about
the community’s values is what actors who are directly democratically
254
In contrast, while such actors can of
accountable are tasked to do.
course make decisions as to how to attain those values and accomplish
those ends, the model of delegating such decisions to those with
technical expertise in the given context, while unavoidably “political” to
some extent, is a coherent position, at least when suitably cabined and
monitored. Administrative law reflects this dynamic.
Election law presents a contrast here. In administrative law, the
ends and means responsibilities are broadly divided between two actors,
with one specializing in politics and the other in expertise. A recurring
claim in election law is that elected officials have greater expertise in
255
politics and the administrative process than do judges. Whether or not

253. See RICHARDSON, supra note 128, at 114–18 (describing the distinction as naïve).
254. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 90–91 (1999) (discussing
the model of the legislature as “the primary forum where our thinking and disagreement
about justice takes place”).
255. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for
example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical
legislative judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such constitutional evils as,
say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.”);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 261 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have corruptive potential; but
the Court strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to what may
improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this
bill and the President who signed it.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (“Legislative responses throughout the country to the reapportionment
demands of the 1960 Census have glaringly confirmed that these are not factors that lend
themselves to evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determinations or for
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that is true, election law often leaves the legislature to play both roles in
practice—the political actor on the one hand, and the expert on the
other, and its work product can usefully be reviewed on that bifurcated
basis.
On the model proposed here, subject to substantive constitutional
protections, the legislature can adopt the democratic value of its
choosing. However, the means of achieving that goal would not be
subject to pure political discretion, but to a requirement of exercised
instrumental judgment. As I develop below, this requirement serves as
a means of ensuring that the stated end is a plausible purpose and of
protecting the effective operation of the democratic process by
preserving the possibility of accountability.
I describe here the broad outlines of how the administrative law
framework might be adapted for use in the election law setting and
sketch how the doctrine could apply in two controversial and
complicated election law settings: challenges to voter identification
provisions and to partisan districting schemes.
A. Adapting the Administrative Law Framework
Adapting an administrative law model for use in the election law
setting requires some changes, especially when the issue involves only
one actor—the legislature as enactor of the challenged provision—
rather than multiple actors (e.g., the agency, Congress, the executive).
The framework proposed here would apply whether the challenged
action is promulgated by Congress, a state legislature, a state
administrative official, or a local elections body. Likewise, in light of the
256
localized nature of American election governance, I do not distinguish
in terms of framework of review between decisions made at the federal,
state, or local levels. This approach is thus actor-indifferent across
election settings.
Adapting the administrative law model requires that we distinguish
the ends and means of the challenged election provision and apply
distinct forms of review to each. The ends of the provision would be
treated as political and granted the usual deference accorded the
legislative process, subject to constitutional right to vote principles, such
as the requirement that the only permitted ends are those internal to the
which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or experience or native wit.”).
256. See Tokaji, The Future, supra note 29, at 130–31 (discussing “decentralization of
election administration authority”).
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election process,
the demands of constitutional equality,
and
259
protections against severe burdens on voters. Where this framework
has added bite is in the demand that there be a specified publicregarding end and not merely incumbent protection or partisan gain. To
be sure, the Supreme Court has indicated that incumbent protection can
260
be a “legitimate factor in districting,” and commentators have
261
criticized this form of manipulation along with others discussed above.
The argument that incumbent protection is an inappropriate
justification for a districting scheme follows from the basic argument
here, that democratic legitimacy demands that decisions about the
electoral process be made not on a purely political basis and that the
262
process be open to revision.
Subjecting the government’s choice of means to a standard of
exercised expertise or instrumental rationality would depart from
Supreme Court decisions that provide that the state is not required to
263
present evidence supporting its claimed purposes. As these holdings
demonstrate, the current Burdick or Crawford sliding-scale model for
evaluating right to vote claims is at heart a political rather than expertise
model. The approach advanced here would not necessarily bar the state
from acting prophylactically or subject the state to rigorous evidentiary
demands, but would merely require the State to show that the
challenged provision is a rational means of achieving the specified end.
257. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299–300 (1975) (“The use of the franchise to compel
compliance with other, independent state objectives is questionable in any context.”).
258. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding a poll tax
unconstitutional under Equal Protection clause).
259. See supra note 66–67 and accompanying text.
260. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440–41 (2006) (“The
Court has noted that incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting, but
experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms, not all of them in the
interests of the constituents.” (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983))).
261. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 36, at 709–10 & n.274 (listing sources criticizing
“self-serving manipulation of the rules of political engagement”).
262. See supra Part IV.B.
263. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997) (explaining
that the Court does not “require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the
State’s asserted justifications”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (noting that
“this Court never has held a State ‘to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective
effects on political stability that [are] produced’ by the voting regulation in question” (quoting
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986))); Munro, 479 U.S. at 195–96
(concluding that “[l]egislatures . . . should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in
the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is
reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights”).
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I turn now to describe how this approach might proceed in two
prominent settings.
B. Voter Identification
Consider voter identification provisions.
The Indiana law
264
challenged in Crawford provides a useful example. This statute
requires voters to display valid, government-issued photo identification
265
before casting a ballot. The statute further provides that voters who
cannot do so may cast a provisional ballot at the polls, which would be
counted if the voter appears within ten days at a Board of Elections
office either presenting such identification or executing an affidavit that
266
she is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed.
The requirement does not apply to absentee ballots or to voters living
267
This law is broadly similar to, though
and voting in nursing homes.
somewhat more stringent than, voter identification provisions enacted in
268
other states.
The provision was justified on the basis of protecting the security of
elections against voter fraud. While this explanation is plausible at some
level, we should consider what this requirement has the capacity to
accomplish: it can only protect against the type of electoral fraud
269
premised on not being able to show such identification at the polls. A
model of review concerned with instrumental rationality will focus
foremost on how well this means serves the relevant end.
How would this review work? Security of the electoral process
against fraud is an undoubtedly legitimate end, as the Supreme Court
270
has recognized, and one within the capacity of democratic actors to
make as a political choice. But, whereas under the Burdick framework

264. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). As noted above, the
statute was enacted along party lines. See id. at 203 (noting that “all of the Republicans in the
General Assembly voted in favor of SEA 483 and the Democrats were unanimous in
opposing it”).
265. Id. at 185.
266. Id. at 186.
267. Id. at 185–86.
268. Id. at 222 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “Indiana’s photo identification
requirement is one of the most restrictive in the country”).
269. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 649–50 (2007)
(noting that “[p]hoto-identification advocates also often cite irregularities that would not be
prevented by a photo-identification requirement” and providing examples).
270. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196 (“While the most effective method of preventing election
fraud may well be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear.”).
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that would be the end of the analysis (unless the requirement
constituted a severe burden), the model advanced here would go on to
ask whether the challenged provision is an instrumentally rational
means of achieving that end.
The State may run into trouble here, insofar as there is no evidence
271
of this type of fraud ever occurring in Indiana, much as Georgia was
likewise unable to provide any such evidence in defending its voter
272
identification provision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court plurality
upholding the voter identification law in Crawford was able to supply
only two examples of such fraud: one nearly 150 years ago and the other
involving a single fraudulent voter in the closely examined 2004
273
Washington gubernatorial election. Under a hard look type of review
274
like that set out in State Farm, the lack of evidence of such fraud
simultaneously calls into question the legislature’s choice of means and
275
the plausibility of the stated end.
Is it possible, as Judge Posner suggests in his opinion for the Seventh
Circuit in Crawford, that this fraud is so difficult to detect that we could
never determine its real extent and that the legislature must therefore
276
act prophylactically?
While it may be possible, this framing, which
relies on a sort of variant of the precautionary principle, is at odds with
Judge Posner’s claim in the same opinion that the instrumental value of
the ballot to the individual citizen is effectively non-existent because one
277
vote will almost never sway an election. If that is correct, there seems
little reason to protect against the threat of someone risking a felony
conviction to cast an extra ballot, a failure of rationality that would be
caught by the proposed inquiry. Perhaps more significantly, this
argument presumes a contested value commitment about democracy,
that preventing a fraudulent vote is worth deterring a legitimate voter,
271. Id. at 194 (“The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in
Indiana at any time in its history.”).
272. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(noting Georgia Secretary of State’s testimony on this point).
273. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 nn.11–12.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 185–186.
275. See Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that his
suggested approach—for “closer scrutiny of decisions made by party-affiliated state or local
election officials”—“might be analogized to ‘hard look’ review in administrative law”).
276. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2007).
277. Id. at 951 (arguing that “[t]he benefits of voting to the individual voter are elusive
(a vote in a political election rarely has any instrumental value, since elections for political
office at the state or federal level are never decided by just one vote)”).
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the inverse of the criminal justice balance or a model of overprotection
278
of rights more generally.
Even if this balance reflects a permissible
substantive decision under the right to vote, a difficult question I do not
engage here, there is surely some upper bound on the striking of that
balance, an assessment that an inquiry as to instrumental rationality
would shed light on as well.
Employing a means-ends analysis premised on instrumental
rationality as to means thus raises hard questions as to why the
requirement to show valid, government-issued photo identification at
the polls was thought an effective way of preventing ballot fraud.
Raising such questions does not answer them, as the ultimate outcome
of the analysis will potentially vary depending on the extent to which
voters lack identification, on the various exceptions or work-arounds
provided, or on the efforts to expand the availability of identification
attached to the requirement. My aim here is to highlight the types of
questions courts should be asking in these cases, focusing on the state
action and whether it can be defended on political-instrumental terms
rather than as a manipulation of the democratic process.
C. Districting
Districting claims pose some intractable problems: On what criteria
should district lines be drawn? Which considerations are permissible
and which not? Can these decisions be made on political bases, or is
there some objective apolitical means of drawing district lines? These
questions have long been debated, and numerous approaches have been
advanced. My purpose is not to reprise or survey the various proffered
solutions but to sketch how the framework proposed here would apply
in the districting setting.
The Vieth decision highlights the difficulties inherent in approaching
these claims, as it is predicated on the idea that even though partisan
districting may be constitutionally problematic, there are no manageable
279
standards by which courts can identify where the “too much” line is.

278. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695–96, 1709 (2008) (using federal jury system in criminal cases as
model of system designed to overprotect rights, and uneasily defending judicial review on that
account).
279. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (concluding that “no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have
emerged”). This is Justice Scalia’s position on the nondelegation doctrine as well: the
Constitution prohibits “too much” delegation, but the line at which a delegation is too much
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And, despite valiant efforts to identify the point at which partisanship is
280
too great,
it is plausibly difficult to specify the border of
constitutionality. Some have tried to get around this hurdle with a
“wherever the line is, this is clearly too much” framing, arguing, for
281
example, for a rule against mid-decade redistricting.
The
administrative law model would avoid this issue, resting not on the
competitiveness of the districts directly, but by focusing on the meansends relationship of the districting scheme.
How would this work? When faced with a challenge to a districting
scheme, the court would evaluate whether the lines drawn reflect a
viable instrumental means to a legitimate political end. What counts as
a legitimate political end? The thrust of the argument here indicates
that protecting incumbents would not be valid nor, correspondingly,
would a goal of advancing the interests of one political party against the
other. So the defenders of the districting scheme would have to identify
other values or interests the line-drawers sought to further, many or
282
most of which would be legitimate political choices. The demand of
is impossible for courts to identify and so the doctrine is unenforceable. See Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “while the doctrine
of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional
system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts” and that ultimately “the debate
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree”).
280. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for application
of standard from racial gerrymandering cases to partisan gerrymandering claims); id. at 346–
52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (advocating burden-shifting framework focused on unfairness of
individual districts); id. at 361–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (developing standard targeted at the
“democratic harm of unjustified entrenchment” based on “strong indicia of abuse”); Berman,
supra note 22, at 838–44 (developing possible decision rule for partisan gerrymandering
claims requiring showing “that the expected partisan value of the challenged scheme (to the
party with majority control of the legislature) is more than x% greater than the expected
partisan value of the redistricting scheme in the yth percentile of all maps generated in an
appropriately pseudo-random fashion”).
281. See Berman, supra note 22, at 845–52 (arguing that “[c]ourts should conclude that
mid-decade redistrictings undertaken by a single-party-controlled state government are
motivated by excessive partisanship—hence are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest”); Adam Cox, Commentary, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting
Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2004) (arguing that “a procedural limitation on the
frequency of redistricting that prohibits redistricting more than once each decennial cycle”
would promote partisan fairness).
282. For an illustration of these challenging decisions, see Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F.
Supp. 119, 127 (W.D. La. 1994) (“The agricultural regions of District 4 include cotton,
soybean, rice, sugar cane, and timber. Such diverse agricultural constituency have few
common interests. We continue to question how one Congressional representative could
adequately represent the varying interests of residents in such far-flung areas of the State.”).
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instrumental rationality as to means would then serve as a way to ensure
that the stated ends were actually furthered. In short, a state defendant
would not be able to defend a gerrymander designed to protect one
political party by claiming that the scheme was drawn to ensure
representation for communities of interest unless it in fact plausibly does
so. In this way, subjecting the state to this sort of means-ends analysis—
while ruling out partisan or incumbent-protecting manipulations as valid
ends—can function as an alternative to the difficult line-drawing called
forth by an approach premised on protecting against too much
partisanship or too little competitiveness.
Undoubtedly, the districting context is extraordinarily complicated,
with a multitude of factors going into the placement of each line,
combined with the requirements of compliance with the demands of one
283
person–one vote, Shaw v. Reno, and the Voting Rights Act.
Nonetheless, in the face of continuing interest in the use of independent
districting commissions, and given the Court’s indication that there is
some constitutional concern underlying this area, a solution that leaves
districting within the political process but cabins it with the demands of
administrative rationality may present a desirable alternative.
What do I expect to come of this framework? Ideally, not very
much. One would hope that our representatives and election officials
are already exercising reasoned judgment as to means of reaching
public-regarding, constitutionally valid ends when regulating the
electoral process, and I believe that they may often be doing so. This
approach would be relevant when they do not. Indeed, I would not
expect this model to significantly increase the volume of litigation in the
federal courts, as any case where adopting this approach would affect
the outcome is likely a case that already will come before the federal
courts under existing doctrine.
The administrative law doctrine developed over many years presents
a considered and elaborate response to concerns about democratic
legitimacy that has proven enforceable by courts and supportive of the
legitimacy of state action. In promoting political oversight of ends
decisions and exercised rationality as to means, the doctrine combines
effective governance with a democratic imprimatur.
Given the
continuing concerns about self-dealing in the electoral process, the

283. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973j (2006); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 649 (1993); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1983) (demanding exact
equality between districts).
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administrative law model presents an appealing and viable alternative
approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, my framework reduces to something resembling a blend
of intermediate scrutiny and arbitrary and capricious review; I consider
this a virtue of the argument. In pursuing this inquiry, my intention is to
highlight resources for confronting these issues that have been
developed by courts in a related setting and to urge courts to make use
of those tools. Much as psychological research shows that people find
arguments more persuasive when they believe they are their own
284
ideas, to the extent a promising approach to election claims has
already been formulated and applied by courts in other contexts, that
approach might find purchase in the election setting as well. The Court
285
has made clear its distaste for complicated rules in this setting, and has
elsewhere demonstrated some comfort with “borrowing” frameworks
286
from one context to another. If the concerns about responsiveness are
clear in the operation of the government, they are equally salient in the
formation of the government, and judicial monitoring provides one
useful model of ensuring the commitments to popular selection and
accountability that are the very purposes of elections. Judicial oversight
of this sort will not solve all the concerns in this area any more than it
does in administrative law, but it would be a good start.

284. See DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS
DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 107–22 (2010) (describing the “Not-InventedHere bias” and “our tendency to overvalue what we create”); cf. INCEPTION (Warner Bros.
2010) (suggesting the business value of convincing a competitor that an idea is his own).
285. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732 (“[A]ppellants argue that a maximum deviation
of approximately 0.7% should be considered de minimis. If we accept that argument, how are
we to regard deviations of 0.8%, 0.95%, 1%, or 1.1%?”).
286. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 459 (2010) (examining the practice of borrowing in constitutional law).
OF

